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Economics v. Equity:
Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms
Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?
Stephen M. Johnson*
I The Shift from Command and Control Regulation to
Market-Based Reforms
For almost three decades, the federal government and state governments
have addressed environmental problems primarily through "command and
control" regulation. Under this traditional approach, the federal government
establishes uniform national pollution limits ("command") that the federal or
state governments impose on individual polluters through a system of permits
or other controls.' However, as the command and control approach has
eliminated many of the most prolific sources of pollution, the incremental cost
of cleaning up the remaining pollution has risen dramatically,2 and command
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1. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1334-35 (1985) (describing command and control regulation); see also
ROBERTV. PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 131-79 (2d
ed. 1996) (describing command and control regulation and its alternatives); Robert C. Anderson
& Andrew Q. Lohof, Environmental Law Institute, The United States Experience with Eco-
nomic Incentives in Environmental Pollution Control Policy § 3.2 (Aug. 1997) (visited Aug.
4,1998) <http://206.29.48.66/epalib/mcentnsf/Sabout> [hereinafterELIReport] (same). While
the uniform national limits may be set at a level to protect health or the environment, they are
usually set at a level that can be achieved through the use of a particular technology. See
PERCIVAL, supra, at 151-54. Although some commentators suggestthat "command and control"
regulation is limited to regulations that require the use of a specific technology, see David
Driesen, Is Emissions Tradingan Economic Incentive Program?: Replacingthe Command and
Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. &LEEL.REV. 290,297 (1998), this Article
uses the term as it is understood by most legal commentators to include regulation that requires
persons to meet specific performance standards and/or regulation that requires the use of a
specific technology. See Robert W. Hahn & RobertN. Stavins, Incentive-BasedEnvironmental
Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 5-6 (1991).
2. The cost of pollution abatement and control rose from $64 billion in 1973 to over
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and control regulation has become politically less attractive. In addition,
command and control regulation may be too rigid to address many of the
remaining major environmental problems, such as nonpoint source water
pollution.3
Academics have criticized command and control regulation on several
grounds for over a decade.4 Critics argue that command and control regula-
tion is not cost-effective because it normally requires all polluters to comply
with the same pollution limits even though one polluter may be able to reduce
its pollution more cheaply than another polluter and even though it may not
be necessary for all polluters to reduce their pollution to the levels required
by the uniform limits in order to achieve pollution reductions that protect
human health or the environment.6 Critics also argue that command and
control regulation (i) imposes unreasonable information-gathering burdens
and exorbitant costs on government;7 (ii) often imposes disproportionate
burdens on new pollution sources;' and (iii) provides no incentives to pollut-
ers to develop new strategies to reduce their pollution beyond the levels
required by law.9
$121 billion in 1994. See U.S. GENERALAccoUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
CHALLENGES FACING EPA's EFFORTS TO REINVENT ENViRONMENTAL REGULATION, ch. 1
(GAO/RCED-97-155) (July 2, 1997) [hereinafter GAO REINVENTION REPORT].
3. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Search for Regulatory Alternatives, 15 STAN.
ENVrL. L.J. vii, viii-ix (1996). The Clean Water Act defines a "point source" to include "any
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance... from which pollutants are or may be dis-
charged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994). Water pollution, such as runoff from construction
activities, that does not come from "point sources," is called "nonpoint source" pollution. See
PERCIVAL, supra note 1, at 880.
4. See generally, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1333; Howard Latin, Ideal
Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning"
Regulatoy Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1267-1332 (1985).
5. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1335, 1341; Latin, supra note 4, at 1267-
68. "[The cost of controlling a given pollutant may vary by a factor of 100 or more, depending
on the age and location of the plants involved and the control technologies available." Robert
N. Stavins, Harnessing the Marketplace: We Have to Do More with Less, EPA J., May-June
1992, at 21-22. However, as Ackerman and Stewart note, under the command and control
approach, "polluter A is obliged to cut back his own wastes even if it is cheaper for him to pay
his neighbor B to undertake the extra cleanup instead." See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note
1, at 1341.
6. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1335. Conversely, though, when uniform
national limits are based on technology, all polluters in a particular region may comply with the
uniform limits, yet discharge pollution at a level that harms human health or the environment.
7. See id. at 1336-37; see also E. Donald Elliott, Environmental TQM Anatomy of a
Pollution Control Program that Works!, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1840, 1846-47 (1994).
8. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1335-36.
9. See id. at 1336, 1341; see also ELI Report, supra note 1, § 1.2; Stavins, supra note
5, at 22.
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In light of those criticisms and limitations, the federal government and
state governments are increasingly implementing market-based approaches to
address environmental problems." The Clinton Administration has suggested
that "[m]arket incentives should be used to achieve environmental goals,
whenever appropriate,"" and a recent report by the Environmental Law
Institute estimates that governments are using over one hundred different
economic incentive mechanisms to address environmental problems in the
United States.' 2
Instead of mandating uniform pollution reductions on a national basis,
market-based approaches use economic incentives to encourage polluters to
reduce their pollution in the most cost-effective manner. 3 Theoretically,
market-based approaches can achieve the same level of pollution reduction as
command and control regulation at a lower cost. 4 In addition, proponents
claim that market-based approaches can eliminate the information-gathering
burden of command and control regulation on the government. 5
A. Types of "Market-Based Reforms"
The major types of market-based approaches that have been implemented
over the past decade are pollutant trading programs, pollution taxes and sub-
sidies, deposit-refund systems, 6 and regulatory waiver or variance programs
such as the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Project XL or
10. See ELI Report, supra note 1, §§ 2.1.1, 3.3; Stavins, supra note 5, at 21; see also
National Partnership for Reinventing Government, 1993 Report: From Red Tape to Results:
Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less (Sept. 7, 1993) (visited Aug. 4,1998)
<http://www.npr.gov/library/nprrpt/annrptredtpe93/index.html>. While traditional regulatory
approaches, including command and control regulation, can create markets, see Driesen, supra
note 1, at 293, this Article only refers to governmental programs and initiatives that attempt to
take advantage of market forces to encourage environmental or public health protection as
"market-based" programs.
11. See President William J. Clinton, Reinventing Environmental Regulation (revised
Aug. 22, 1996) (visited Aug. 6, 1998) <http:lwww.epa.gov/reinventlnotebooklclinton.htm>.
12. See ELIReport, supra note 1, § 12. EPA reviewed many of the early market-based
experiments in a 1992 report. See Alan Carlin, Environmental Protection Agency, The United
States Experience with Economic Incentives to Control Environmental Pollution (July 1992)
(visited Aug. 6, 1998) <http:/1206.29.48.66/epaleermFile.nsf/vwAIEE-02161$FileIEE-0216-
l.pdF>.
13. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1335; Stavins, supra note 5, at 21-22; see
also ELIReport, supra note 1, § 3.3. Market-based approaches "can save anywhere from 1 0 -
90% of the cost of controlling pollution under traditional command and control approaches."
ELIReport, supra note 1, § 1.2.
14. See ELI Report, supra note 1, § 3.5; Stavins, supra note 5, at 22.
15. See Ackerman& Stewart, supra note 1, at 1336-37; cf Driesen, supra note 1, at 327-
32 (noting that market-based approaches may create complexity, uncertainty, and delay).
16. See ELI Report, supra note 1, § 3.3.4; Stavins, supra note 5, at 22.
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Brownfields Action Agenda. 7 In a pollutant trading program, a government
gives polluters the "right" to discharge a specific amount of pollution and
allows polluters to buy and sell their pollution rights." Under a typical
trading program, ifa polluter is discharging ten tons of pollution, but only has
the "right" to discharge five tons of pollution, the polluter must either reduce
its pollution discharge by five tons or buy the right to discharge an additional
five tons from another polluter. If it costs less for the polluter to buy'the
"right" to discharge an additional five tons of pollution than it costs to reduce
its discharge by five tons, the polluter will buy the additional pollution rights.
Thus, a pollutant trading system allows polluters to choose the most cost-
effective means of controlling pollution. In addition, because they can sell
their pollution "rights" to other polluters, the system provides incentives to
polluters to reduce their pollution discharges beyond the levels allowed by
law.19 In some trading programs, the government auctions or sells some of the
pollution rights to polluters." Accordingly, trading programs can raise
revenue for the government21 while limiting the overall discharge of pollu-
tion.22
Pollution taxes provide benefits that are similar to the benefits of pollut-
ant trading programs. Under the pollution tax approach, the government
imposes a tax on the discharge of a particular type of pollution.' If it costs
17. See infra notes 157-80 and accompanying text (discussing Project XL and brown-
fields projects).
18. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1341. Part II of this Article describes
specific trading programs in greater detail.
19. See id. at 1341-42.
20. See id. at 1343.
21. See id at 1344, 1346.
22. See id. at 1349. The government can reduce aggregate pollution levels by limiting
the overall amount of pollution "rights" that are available to polluters, and by reducing that
amount over time. See id
23. While traditional taxes on income, capital formation, payrolls, sales, and property
generally discourage socially productive activities, pollution taxes discourage environmentally
damaging activities. See Amy C. Christian, Designing a Carbon Tax: The Introduction of the
Carbon-Burned Tax (CBT), 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 221,226 (1992); Richard L. Ot-
tinger & William B. Moore, The Case for State Pollution Taxes, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 103,
105 (1994). Consequently, many legal theorists are advocating a reduction in taxes, like the
income tax, that discourage socially desirable activities, coupled with an increase in taxes, like
pollution taxes, that discourage socially undesirable activities. See Christian, supra, at 226-27;
Ottinger & Moore, supra, at 104. In order to protect human health and the environment,
pollution taxes should be set at a level that is equal to the harm that the pollution discharges
cause to health and the environment. See Frank S. Arnold, Environmental Law Institute, Why
Policy Makers Don't Use Environmental Taxes 1 (Jan. 6, 1994) (visited Aug. 6, 1998) <http://
206.29.48.66/epa/eermfile.nsf/vwAN/EE-0312-1.pdf/$File/EE-0312-1 .pdf> [hereinafter ELI
Tax Report].
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less for a polluter to reduce its discharge of pollution than it costs to pay the
tax for the discharge, the polluter will reduce the pollution discharge. If not,
the polluter will pay the tax.2 4 Accordingly, pollution taxes allow polluters to
control their pollution in the most cost-effective manner.' Pollution taxes
also provide incentives to polluters to reduce their pollution discharges
beyond levels allowed by law because the polluters can reduce their tax
burden by reducing their discharges." Finally, pollution taxes provide reve-
nue for the government in the same way that auctioning pollution "rights" can
provide revenue for the government.2 Unlike trading programs, however,
pollution taxes cannot guarantee that pollution will be reduced to a specific
level.28
Subsidies are the mirror image of pollution taxes.2 9 Instead of taxing
pollution discharges, the government offers subsidies to polluters that reduce
their pollution discharges. 0 If the polluter can reduce its pollution discharge
at a cost that is less than the amount of the subsidy, the polluter will probably
reduce its discharge.
Deposit-refund systems use a combination ofatax and subsidy to encour-
age pollution reduction.31 Consumers of potentially polluting products pay a
surcharge when they purchase the product and receive a refund of the sur-
charge when they return the product for recycling or proper disposal. 2 This
system traditionally has been used to encourage recycling and proper disposal
of beverage containers,33 but states have also used deposit-refund systems for
tires, lead-acid batteries, used motor vehicle oil, and pesticide containers.34
Finally, in regulatory waiver or variance programs, the government allows
polluters to avoid some command and control requirements if the polluter uses
24. See ELI Tax Report, supra note 23, at 1.
25. See id; Roger C. Dower & Robert Repetto, Green Fees and the Need for Fiscal
Restructuring: Opportunities and Challenges, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 161, 161 (1994);
Ottinger & Moore, supra note 23, at 105; Stavins, supra note 5, at22.
26. See Ottinger & Moore, supra note 23, at 105.
27. See ELI Tax Report, supra note 23, at 1; Stavins, supra note 5, at 22.
28. The level ofenvironmentalprotectionthat ataxwill provide will vary dependingupon
the rate of the tax. If the tax is set too low, polluters will not reduce their pollution discharges,
or may actually increase their discharges, and will pay the tax as a cost of doing business. See
ELI Tax Report, supra note 23, at 7-8.
29. ELIReport, supra note 1, § 3.3.2.
30. See id
31. See id § 3.3.4.
32. See id.
33. See id. Nine states, Canadian provinces, and a number of European nations have
enacted "bottle bills" to reduce improper disposal of beverage containers. See Stavins, supra
note 5, at 24.
34. See ELIReport, supra note 1, § 5.1.
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other means to achieve the same level of pollution reduction in a more cost-
effective manner."
B. Economic, Environmental, and Distributional Considerations
Supporters of these market-based approaches cite dozens of studies
which suggest that market-based approaches can reduce pollution control
costs36 and which provide equivalent or better environmental protection than
command and control regulation." Despite the rosy predictions, market-based
reforms have not been implemented in the manner advocated by economists,
participation in market-based reforms has been marginal, and the reforms are
not generating the substantial cost savings that economists predicted. 38
Nevertheless, even if market-based approaches delivered all of the benefits
that economists predict, governments should proceed down the economic path
with caution because market-based approaches could exacerbate existing
problems of environmental injustice.39
35. See infra notes 157-80 and accompanying text (discussing Project XL and brown-
fields projects).
36. See ELI Report, supra note 1, § 12. A recent report by the Environmental Law
Institute identified 19 studies that compared air pollution control costs under traditional
command and control regulation to various market-based reforms. Id. § 3.4, tbl. 3-1. All ofthe
studies concluded that market-based approaches were less costly than command and control
regulation. Id In one study, command and control regulation was found to be 22 times more
costly than a market-based alternative. Id.
The ELI Report also identified nine studies that compared the costs of command and
control regulation for water pollution to market-based reforms. Id § 3.4, tbl. 3-2. All of those
studies concluded that the market-based approaches were less costly, although the cost differ-
ences were less pronounced than in the air pollution studies. See id
37. See id. Executive Summary. Although market-based alternatives are generally de-
signed to provide environmental protection that is similar to command and control regulation,
few studies have examined whether they have achieved that level of protection in practice. See
id. § 12.
38. See id. §§ 3.4, 12. There are many reasons why market-based reforms have not
performed as predicted. In many cases, pollution taxes and fees have been designed merely to
raise revenue, and have been set too low to provide incentives to reduce pollution. See id.
Executive Summary. Complicated regulations have inhibited participation in trading programs.
See id. In addition, because of regulatory and legal requirements, opportunities for trading
pollution rights are more limited in practice than economists propose in theory. See id § 3.4.
Consequently, there is little empirical evidence that emissions trading has stimulated environ-
mental performance that is superiorto traditional command and control regulation. SeeDriesen,
supra note 1, at 313.
39. "Environmental injustice" is the antithesis of "environmental justice," which EPA
defines as
the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people, regardless of race,
color, national origin, or income, with respect to the development, implementation,
and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, programs, and policies. Fair
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C. Inevitable Inequities in Market-Based Reforms
It is well established that minority and low-income communities suffer
disproportionate exposure to a variety of types of pollution under the existing
command and control regulatory approach.' Although the traditional ap-
treatment means that no racial, ethnic, or socio-economic group should bear a
disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from
industrial, municipal, and commercial operations, or from the execution of federal,
state, local, or tribal programs and policies.
Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Justice ThroughPollutionPrevention Grant
Program (1998) (visited Aug. 6, 1998) <http:llwww.epa.gov/opptintr/ejp2/intro-ix.htm>.
40. Studies indicate that hazardous waste landfills and treatment facilities and industries
that emit the greatest amounts of toxic chemicals have been sited predominantly in minority or
low-income communities. See generally COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JusTICE, UNITED CHURCH
OF CHRIST, ToxIc WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE
RACIAL AND SOCiO-ECONOMIC CHARAcTERusTIcs OF COMMUNmEs wrH HAZARDOUS WASTE
SITES (1987); BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN, NOT JUST PROsPERITY: ACHIEVING SUSTAINABILITY
WITH ENVIRONMENTAL JUsTICE (1993); DR. BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN & LAURA FITTON, TOXIc
WASTES AND RACE REVISITED: AN UPDATE OF THE 1987 REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITImS WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 14-15 (1994);
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR
CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983);
Paul Mohai, Methodological Issues: The Demographics ofDumpingRevisited: Examining the
Impact of Alternate Methodologies in Environmental Justice Research, 14 VA. ENVL. L.J. 615,
615-53 (1995).
A recent series of newspaper articles in the Detroit News challenged these studies and
discussed an EPA study that concluded that (a) while 12% of the country's residents are
African-American, only 8% of the residents that live near Superfund sites in EPA Region VI
are African-American; (b) 75% of the residents that live near Region IV Superfund sites are
white; and (c) the average income of residents living within a mile of Superfund sites nation-
wide is greater than the average national income. David Mastio, EPA Ignored Race Report,
DET. NEWS, May 28, 1998, at Al. While the study could be interpreted to suggest that heavily
polluted waste sites are not predominantly located in low-income or minority communities, it
could also be interpreted to suggest that the government is quicker to include sites on the
Federal Superfund list if they are not located in a low-income or minority community. Because
inclusion of a site on the Federal Superfund list leads to a cleanup of the site with federal
oversight by EPA, the study may actually support claims that environmental laws are being
enforced in a discriminatory manner.
Studies also suggest that the federal government is bringing enforcement actions under
environmental laws and making cleanup decisions under Superfund in a discriminatory manner.
See UNEQUAL PROTECTON: ENVmONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 7-11
(Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994); Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The
Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S1, S1-12; Rae Zimmer-
man, Social Equity and Environmental Risk, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 6, 652 (July 14, 1993).
Air quality in minority and low-income communities is worse than in other communities.
See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 796 & n.36 (1993); see also Hearings on
Environmental Justice Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 103d Cong.
(1993) (statement of Paul Mohai); D.R. Wernette & L.A. Nieves, Breathing Polluted Air:
Minorities Are Disproportionately Exposed, EPA J., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 16-17.
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proach clearly has not adequately addressed distributional inequities, market-
based approaches will inevitably exacerbate those inequities. While the
traditional command and control environmental laws and regulations do not
explicitly require the government to avoid actions that disparately impact low-
income or minority communities, those laws also do not affirmatively encour-
age unequal distribution ofpollution. By contrast as explained below, many
market-based approaches to environmental protection affirmatively encourage
polluters to shift pollution to lower-income communities. While command
and control regulation may be facially neutral, but discriminatory in practice,
many market-based approaches are designedin away that will inevitably treat
low-income communities unfairly.
Classical economic theory institutionalizes and exacerbates existing social
disparities that are based on unequal distributions of income. As Judge
Richard Posner suggested, in a free market economy, in which voluntary
exchange is permitted, "resources are shifted to those uses in which the value
to consumers, as measured by their willingness to pay, is highest. When
resources are being used where their value is highest we may say that they are
being employed efficiently."42 Although Judge Posner defined "value" in
terms of"willingness to pay," on closer reflection it is clear that Judge Posner
and other economists incorporated "ability to pay" into the concept of "will-
ingnessto pay."'4 Thus, undertraditional economictheory, a pollutanttrading
In addition, the federal government establishes regulations under avariety ofenvironmen-
tal laws to protect persons from exposure to hazardous levels of toxic substances based on
assumptions that may not protect various ethnic or racial communities. See Robert R. Kuehn,
The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative RiskAssessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV.
103, 105.
41. Command and control laws establish uniform standards to achieve a minimum level
of environmental protection. See sources cited supra note I (discussing command and control
laws). In theory, this approach should guarantee a minimum level ofprotection for all commu-
nities. However, because the laws do not explicitly address distributional considerations, they
do not guarantee that all communities will be exposed to the same level ofpollution, at or below
that minimum level. Market forces, unequal enforcement patterns, and other factors funnel
higher levels ofpollution into low-income and minority communities. See sources cited supra
note 40 (discussing pollution and low-income or minority communities). If the minimum level
of protection provided by command and control laws safeguarded human health and the
environment, the variance in pollution levels would be less problematic. However, the mini-
mum level of protection provided by command and control laws often does not safeguard
human health and the environment. See sources cited supra note 1 (discussing command and
control regulation).
42. RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.1, at 11 (4th ed. 1992)
(emphasis added).
43. Judge Posner relates the following story to explain the economist's definition of
"value":
Suppose that pituitary extract is in very scarce supply relative to the demand and
is therefore very expensive. A poor family has a child who will be a dwarf if he
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program, tax program, or similar market-based reform that shifts pollution to
low-income communities is operating efficiently and, therefore, desirably
because resources, such as clean air and clean water, are shifted to the uses in
which the value to consumers, as measured by their willingness (and ability)
to pay, is highest. Because wealthy communities are "willing to pay" more for
clean air and water than low-income communities, the market operates effi-
ciently when it funnels those resources to those communities" rather than to
low-income communities. In a free market, low-income communities will
never have sufficient financial resources to buy clean air, clean water, and
similar environmental and public health resources from wealthy communities
or polluters.
As Professor James White has astutely noted, the economists' justifica-
tion for the "efficiency" of the free market "takes for granted not only the
existing values (or tastes) of the actors, but also the existing distributions
among them of wealth, capacity and entitlement, which it has no way of
criticizing."' 5 Furthermore, Professor White has observed that
[t]he market ideology claims to be radically democratic and egalitarian,
because it leaves every person free to do with her own what she will. But
this freedom of choice is not equally distributed among all people. The
market is democratic not on the principle of one person one vote, but on
the far different principle of one dollar, one vote.46
does not get some of the extract, but the family cannot afford the price.... A rich
family has a child who will grow to normal height, but the extract will add a few
inches more, and his parents decide to buy it for him. In the sense of value used in
this book, the pituitary extract is more valuable to the rich than to the poor family,
because value is measured by willingness to pay ....
Id. at 13. While Posner suggests that the rich family is more "willing to pay" for the extract than
the poor family, it seems that the rich family is more "able to pay" than the poor family, rather
than more "willing to pay." Posner's definition of willingness to pay, therefore, seems to
incorporate ability to pay.
44. Professor Gerald Torres notes:
The essence of the market suggests that poor people will be disadvantaged in
relation to relatively better off people in the acquisition of goods. Environmental
quality is merely a good that also is market sensitive. Thus, it should not be
surprising that poor people, and poor black people as a subset of that economic
class, suffer greater environmental burdens than do better off people. Poor people
merely choose, and rationally so,to spend their scarce resources on other goods.
Gerald Torres, Environmental Justice: The Legal Meaning ofa Social Movement, 15 J.L. &
COM. 597, 607-08 (1996).
45. James Boyd White, Economics andLaw: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN.L.REV.
161, 178 (1987).
46. Id at 184. White further notes:
[T]he modem celebration ofthe market as the central social institution.., threatens
to destroy the single greatest achievement of Western political culture: the discov-
ery that a community can govern itself through arule of law that attempts to create
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In response to those criticisms, economists admit that economic theory
does not make value judgments regarding the distribution of resources or
regarding the moral or social implications of "efficient" allocations of re-
sources.47 Economists admit that economic theory does not address the
important underlying question regarding whether an efficient allocation of
resources is socially or ethically desirable.48 Nevertheless, they argue that
economic theory provides a valuable tool for analysis and prediction of
behavior.4 9
However, environmental law developed and flourished precisely because
economic theory, and the free market, did not address those social concerns.5"
Environmental laws often incorporate a moral vision and strive to advance
civic values that are ignored in the free market."1 Environmental law responds
to the failure of the free market to prevent pollution and the destruction of
natural resources. While environmental laws should weigh economic issues,
the laws should not substitute economic considerations for the important
a fundamental moral and political equality among human beings. The great phrase
in the Declaration of Independence - "all men are created equal".- is partly a
theological statement about the conditions under which we are created and partly
apolitical statement aboutthe obligation ofthe government to acknowledge, indeed
to create or recreate, that equality.... The ideology of the market, if it prevailed
in its desire to convert all institutions into markets, would destroy this set of polit-
ical relations and create another in its stead, based upon the dollar.
Id. at 183.
47. See PosNER, supra note 42, at 14.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 17-18.
50. As Professor Zygmunt Plater notes:
Environmental law evolved as a response to the dark side of those dynamic market
forces that have built the world's largest economy and have made modem life so
materially enriched and diverse. Human nature as reflected in the marketplace,.
however, inherently tends to ignore and pass on social costs to the environment and
to others.
Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law as a Mirror ofthe Future: Civic Values Confronting
Market Force Dynamics in a Time of Counter-Revolution, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 733,
737 (1996).
51. Professor Plater notes:
[E]nvironmental law has come to incorporate a set of principles representing and
accounting for civic values that extend far beyond the realm of science and current
events. Perhaps only in environmental law has the modem legal system directly
incorporated issues of long-term societal survival into its operative norms and
doctrinal provisions.... By thus embodying civic values, environmental law
transcends ecology and raises issues of social governance. Scratch an environmen-
tal law argument and you are likely to find an underlying question of democracy-
how individuals, corporations, and communities are to balance their drives and
needs, each day and over future years and generations.
Id. at 737-38.
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social considerations that motivated legislators to enact the laws in the first
place.52
D. Efficiency, Market Failures, and Solutions
Despite the inherent inequities in market-based environmental protection,
governments will continue to implement market-based reforms to achieve
"efficient" allocations of resources. However, governments should proceed
down the economic incentive path with caution because prior market-based
reforms have not delivered on the promise of "efficient" allocation of re-
sources. For example, in a traditional pollutant trading program, Company A
voluntarily buys the "right" to discharge pollution from Company B because
it is cheaper for Company A to buy the "right" to pollute than to reduce the
amount of pollution that it discharges. Although this transaction may be
"cost-effective" for Company A and Company B, it is not clear that it is an
"efficient" transaction from an economic standpoint.
If the transaction is examined in terms of Pareto-optimal efficiency,
where a "Pareto-superior" transaction is one that makes at least one person
better off and no persons worse off,53 the trade will probably not be efficient.
Although Company A and Company B are better off, persons who live near
Company A, fish in the streams around Company A, or hike in the woods
around Company A may suffer harm from pollution that Company A would
have reduced if it did not buy the right to discharge pollution from Company
B. The third parties are "worse off' as a result ofthe trade. If the third parties
were compensated for the harm that resulted from the trade, the transaction
could be "Pareto-superior."54 Trading programs, however, do not require
participants to compensate third parties for harms caused by the trades.
If the transaction is examined in terms of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,55
under which a transaction is efficient if the economic benefits of the transac-
tion exceed the economic harms of the transaction,56 many trades may be
52. If the free market adequately considered the social concerns that environmental laws
are designed to protect, there would be no need for environmental laws. However,
[t]he human logic of the marketplace lacks a gene for altruism. Without external
constraints, social and political mechanisms driven by individualism are dominated
by short-term profit expediencies, to the detriment of many short and long-term
societal values. They do not incorporate principles that protect the community
when the interests of the community and the individual enterprise diverge.
Id at 763. Accordingly, economic considerations should not be the sole factor that is weighed
in future environmental initiatives.
53. See POSNER, supra note 42, at 13.
54. See id. at 14.
55. "When an economist says that.., the control of pollution or some other policy or
state of the world is efficient, nine times out often he means Kaldor-Hicks efficient.... ." Id
56. See id.
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inefficient. A trade will only be "efficient" if the benefits to the trading
parties and third parties exceed any harm caused by the trade.
The benefits for the trading partners are economically quantifiable. The
seller receives a benefit equal to the amount of money that the seller receives
from the buyer for the pollution "rights" minus the cost, if any, of creating
those "rights" in the first place." The buyer receives a benefit equal to the
amount of money that the seller saved by buying the pollution "rights" instead
of reducing its pollution discharge. Because most of the trading programs that
have been implemented in the past limit the amount of pollution "right" that
a company can buy, by requiring polluters to meet certain minimal pollution
discharge limits, the economic benefits available to companies through trading
have been limited."
While the benefits to the trading partners are economically quantifiable,
the benefits and harms to third parties are often difficult to quantify. Assume,
for instance, that Company A buys the right to continue to discharge 100
pounds of a pollutant into a river. The discharge of that pollution might
(a) contribute to pollution of drinking water that causes adverse health effects
to persons who drink the water and that creates economic costs to the commu-
nity to clean up the water; (b) harm fish in the river, which could have adverse
health impacts and/or economic impacts depending upon the use of the river
by the community; (c) contribute to adverse health impacts to persons who
swim in the water, which could have economic effects if the river is a tourist
attraction; (d) contribute to a decline in plants or organisms in the river, which
could have impacts on the health of the community or on the economy;
(e) contribute to a decline in the aesthetic beauty of the river, which could, in
addition to economic impacts, have psychological and social impacts on the
community.59 It is extremely difficult to identify the extent to which a pollu-
tion trade causes these results.6' In addition, all of these impacts, especially
the health impacts, are extremely difficult to quantify in economic terms.6' As
57. The seller may have changed its production process or otherwise reduced its pollution
output to create its pollution "rights."
58. See ELIReport, supra note 1, § 3.4.
59. The pollution trade may also have benefits for third parties. For example, by purchas-
ing pollution rights, a company may be able to continue to operate in a community, providing
jobs and revenue to the community that would have been lost if the company were not able to
buy the pollution rights. In addition, communities near the company that sold the pollution
rights may receive benefits because the sellermay have reduced its pollution emissions to create
the pollution "rights" that it sold in the trade. These benefits must be weighed with the harms
to determine whether the trade is "efficient:"
60. In order to precisely calculate the harms and benefits of the trade, one must focus on
the harms and benefits caused by the 100 pounds of pollution authorized by the trade.
61. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost ofEnvironmentalRegulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-BenefitAnalysis, 24 ECOLOGYL.Q. 545,558 (1997) (discussing quantifica-
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a result, most of the impacts are ignored or undervalued in economic calcula-
tions.62 To the extent that economists ignore or undervalue these impacts
when analyzing pollutant trading programs, assertions that the programs
operate "efficiently" should be viewed skeptically. While trading programs
and similar market-based approaches may be "cost-effective" for businesses,
it is not clear that they "efficiently" allocate resources throughout society.
Theoretically, in a free-market economy, if the harm that a pollution trade
caused third parties outweighed the benefits to those parties, the third parties
would bargain with the trading parties to prevent the harm. Accordingly,
resources would be allocated efficiently in the free market. However, market
failures prevent the efficient operation of the market for environmental or
public health resources and often prevent low-income communities from even
participating in the market. For a variety of reasons, third parties that are
harmedby apollutanttrademaynotbargainwiththetradingpartnersto prevent
the harm. In some cases, while the aggregate harm to all third parties may
outweigh the benefits of the trade, no single party, or group of parties, may be
harmed sufficiently to be motivated to bargain to prevent the trade. In some
cases, third parties may be willing to bargain with the traders to prevent the
trade but may be unable to pay the traders enough money to prevent the trade.
Finally, in some cases, thethirdparties will notbargain withthetraders because
thethird parties lack information aboutthe potential health, environmental, and
economic impacts of a trade to recognize that the trade will adversely impact
them orto recognize the degree of impact. In each of those situations, although
the harm caused by the trade will outweigh the benefits of the trade, the trade
will be made. Resources will be allocated inefficiently due to market failures.
In orderto compensate forthose market failures, governments that choose
to adopt market-based environmental reforms should take several steps to
ensure that the reforms achieve an "efficient" allocation of resources. Because
third parties may individually lack the motivation to participate in the market,
although their collective injury exceeds the benefits ofa particular transaction,
market-based reforms should include mechanisms to foster collective organiza-
tion of health impacts for cost-benefit analysis); Kuehn, supra note 40, at 116-29 (discussing
methodological limitations of quantification of health impacts for risk assessment).
62. See DanaClark &David Downes, WhatPriee Biodiversity? Economic Incentives and
Biodiversity Conservation in the United States, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LrnG. 9, 19 (1996). Clark
and Downes assert that
[t]he current national income accounting system provides an example ofaperverse
economic incentive.... Rather than recognizing the Exxon Valdez spill for what
it was, namely a decline in the value of natural resources in the area, it is recorded
as an increase in the national income. The spill boosted GNP! All the clean-up
expenditures served to increase national income, but no account was taken of the
consequent depreciation of the natural environment.
Id at 20.
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tion and action by third parties or at least to provide a safety net for third
parties that fail to organize because ofthe hightransaction costs. Because third
parties may lack sufficient information to understand the impacts that various
market-based environmental strategies may have on them, market-based
initiatives should include mechanisms to increase the availability of informa-
tion and the opportunities for public participation. To the extent that financial
disparities reduce the ability of third parties to participate in the market,
market-based initiatives could address the disparities to some extent through
grants and loans. If market-based reforms do not include these safeguards, it
is unlikely that they will achieve "efficient" allocations of resources.
E. The Rest of the Story
As subpartD of this Article illustrates, most market-based environmental
reforms fail to address important social issues, including the distributional
impacts of pollution, and ignore deficiencies in the market that lead to ineffi-
cient allocation of environmental and public health resources. As a result,
those market-based reforms could exacerbate existing environmental injus-
tices. Part II of this Article examines many of the current and proposed
market-based environmental reforms and analyzes the potential disparate
impacts that could arise from those reforms. Part III examines pollution
prevention and multimedia regulation to demonstrate that market-based
approaches could, in some cases, improve environmental quality in an effi-
cient manner and foster environmentaljustice. Finally, Part IV explores ways
that market-based reforms are being, or could be, modified to ensure that
environmental protection initiatives foster environmental justice and allocate
resources "efficiently."
I. Market-Based Environmental Programs and Potential
Disparate Impacts
The federal government and state governments have implemented avariety
of different market-based environmental protection programs over the past
decade. Some ofthe major initiatives are pollutanttrading programs, pollution
taxes, and EPA's Project XL and Brownfields initiatives. While those pro-
grams are reducing the overall cost of environmental protection for businesses,
they could perpetuate the disparate treatment of low-income communities.
A. Pollutant Trading Systems and Potential Disparate Impacts
Most of the pollutant trading programs that have been implemented in the
United States have focused on reducing air pollution. 3 Despite potentially
63. See Stavins, supra note 5, at 24.
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large cost savings, trading has been limited under most of the state and federal
trading programs.'
Although most trading programs have been implemented in the past
decade, the EPA began experimenting with pollutant trading under the Clean
Air Act in the 1970s.65 Those early experiments matured into EPA's 1986
Clean Air Act emissions trading policy for "criteria" pollutants, including
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, particulates, carbon monoxide, lead, and
ozone.' Under the policy, companies are allowed to build new major air
pollution sources' or make major modifications to major air pollution sources
in areas of the country where national air pollution standards are not being
met68 if the companies build the source to meet certain technology-based
standards and enter into an agreement with an existing air pollution source in
the area whereby the existing source reduces its pollution output by at least as
much pollution as the new or modified source plans to discharge.69 The policy
refers to the reductions as "emission reduction credits,"7 which can be used
to "offset" proposed pollution increases. Companies can obtain offsets by
entering into agreements with other companies or by reducing the output of
pollution from another source that they own in the polluted area where the
new or modified source will be sited.7' Because increases in air pollution by
64. See ELI Report, supra note 1, § 3.3.3.
65. Id ch. 6.
66. See Final Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,814 (1986).
67. The policy refers to "major stationary sources," which are defined in the Clean Air
Act as sources that have the potential to emit 100 tons per year of any pollutant. 42 U.S.C.
§ 76020) (1994).
68. EPA sets national ambient air pollution limits, called national ambient air quality
standards, for "criteria" pollutants. Id. § 7409. States are divided into geographic regions,
called air quality control regions, for purposes of regulation under the Clean Air Act. Id.
§ 7407. If the air quality in an air quality control region does not meet the national ambient air
quality standard for a particular pollutant, the region is said to be in "nonattainment" for that
pollutant. Id. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i).
69. Id § 7503.
70. Under the policy, a pollution reduction can be certified as an "emission reduction
credit" only if the reduction is greater than any reduction required by law, enforceable, perma-
nent, and quantifiable. Final Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. at 43,831.
71. Id The Clean Air Act also allows companies to use offsets when the companies plan
to build new major sources of air pollution or make major modifications to major sources in air
quality control regions that meet the national ambient air quality standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7475
(1994). While the nonattainment provisions of the Clean Air Act prohibit increases in pollution
in dirty air quality control regions, the Act allows a limited increase in the amount of pollution
in clean air quality control regions. Id. If a company plans to build a new major source of air
pollution orto make amajor modification ofamajor source in a clean air quality control region,
it must ensure that the increased pollution from the source will not exceed the limits allowed
for the region. Id. If the pollution will exceed those limits, companies can only build the
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new sources are offset by reductions from existing sources, the offset program
should ensure that air quality remains at least as good, if not better, than it
would be without the program. While the program promises cost savings for
businesses, very few companies have made offset trades with other compa-
nies.'
The emissions trading policy also formalizes the concepts of "bubbles"
and "netting" for airpollution regulation. The "bubble" concept allows regula-
tors to treat several existing air pollution emission points within an air quality
control region as a single "source" for purposes of determining whether the
emission points are complying with technology-based air pollution limits.'
"Netting" allows regulators to treat several air pollution emission points within
aplant as a single "source" for purposes ofdeterminingwhether amodification
to the plant, or construction of a new portion of the plant, triggers stringent
technology-based limits and permit requirements for the plant.74
While EPA's emission trading policy was the agency's first major foray
into pollutant trading, the sulfur dioxide emission trading program created by
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments:' often is cited as a model for future
pollutant trading programs at the federal and state levels. The trading program
is designed to reduce by half sulfur dioxide emissions from coal-fired electric
power plants by early in the next century. During Phase I of the program,
which began in 1995 and ends in 2000, 111 of the dirtiest power plants were
given annual "allowances" to emit 2.5 pounds of sulfur dioxide for every
sources if they obtain offsets equal to the amount of increased pollution. See Final Policy
Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. at 43,831.
72. Nationally, only 10% of "offset" trades occur between companies. See ELIReport,
supra note 1, § 6.1.1.1. Usually, companies generate emission reduction credits by closing or
making changes to an existing source, and companies use those credits to "offset" the pollution
from their new source. Id Offset trades between companies have been frustrated by many
factors including regulatory limits on trades and transaction costs of negotiating a trade. Id.
§ 6.1.1.5.
73. A bubble can include multiple emission points within a single facility, multiple
facilities owned by the same company, or multiple facilities owned by different companies, as
long as all of the facilities are within the same air quality control region. See id. § 6.1.1.2. It
is estimated that bubbles have saved businesses more than $435 million in pollution control
costs. Id.
74. See Final Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,830 (1986). Netting is used
more often than offsets or bubbles. See ELIReport, supra note 1, § 6.1.1.4. Between 5000 and
12,000 air pollution sources have used netting. Id Because netting allows a small increase in
pollution over the limits that would exist without netting, this "reform" can have adverse effects
on the environment. Id. Through netting, companies save money by (a) avoiding more
stringent pollution control costs that would apply to the source if netting were not allowed;
(b) avoiding the costs of permit review and approval; and (c) avoiding construction delays that
could result from the permitting process. Id
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (1994).
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million Btu consumed by the plant.76 During Phase HI, which begins in 2000,
all power plants that produce more than 25 megawatts will be given "allow-
ances" to emit 1.2 pounds of sulfur dioxide for every million Btu consumed
by the plant.77 Total emissions from all of the plants are capped at 8.90
million tons of sulfur dioxide at the end of the program. 8 Utilities can trade
allowances with other utilities, bank allowances for up to 30 years, and buy
allowances at an annual auction sponsored by EPA.79 Although the program
targets coal-fired power plants, industrial facilities that burn fossil fuels can
also "opt-in" to the program."' Utilities covered by the program have achieved
100% compliance with Phase I requirements,"1 and the program is producing
significant environmental and economic benefits.8 2 In addition to the sulfur
dioxide trading program and EPA's emission trading policy, EPA has imple-
mented pollutant trading programs in an effort to phase out production of
various types of chlorofluorocarbons and halons 3 and to phase out the use of
76. See MARK SQUILLACE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW VOLUME ThREE: AIR POLLuTON 301
(2d ed. 1992).
77. Id
78. 42U.S.C. § 765lb(a)(1)(1994).
79. See ELIReport, supra note 1, § 6.1.7. By early 1997, utilities had traded more than
7.2 million allowances and purchased over 300,000 allowances at EPA auctions. Id
80. 42 U.S.C. § 7651i (1994). EPA issued final regulations to implement the opt-in
program in 1995. See Opting Into the Acid Rain Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,100 (1995) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 72-78).
8 1. See OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, UNITED STATES ENVRONMENTAL PROTE-mON
AGENCY, 1995 COMPLIANCE RESULTS: ACID RAIN PROGRAM 1 (EPA/430-R-96-012) (1996).
In the first year of the program, utilities reduced sulfur dioxide emissions by 5.6 million tons,
although they were only required to reduce emissions by 2.2 million tons. See Utilities Double
Required S02 Reductions; EPA Allowance Auction Generates $18 Million, 26 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 2249 (Mar. 29, 1996).
82. EPA estimates that compliance with the sulfur dioxide emissions trading program
costs about $1.2 billion annually for Phase I and will cost $2.2 billion annually for Phase II,
while a command and control approach would cost between $4.5 and $6 billion annually. See
ELI Report, supra note 1, § 6.1.7. In addition, Resources for the Future, a policy think-tank,
recently published a report which concludes that the benefits of the sulfur dioxide trading
program, which include reductions in illnesses and premature death, reduced impact on lakes,
streams, and other aquatic environments and improved visibility, will be 13 times greater than
the costs of the program by 2010. See Benefits of EPA 's Acid Rain Program Far Exceed Its
Costs, Researchers Find, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 888 (Sept 19, 1997). While Congress focused
on environmental benefits of sulfur dioxide emissions reductions when it created the trading
program, recent studies have demonstrated that the health benefits of sulfur dioxide emission
reduction dwarf all environmental benefits. See ELIReport, supra note 1, § 6.1.7.
83. In order to phase out consumption (production plus imports, minus exports) of certain
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and halons to comply with terms of the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, EPA distributed "allowances" to companies that
produced or imported CFCs and halons, which the companies could trade among themselves.
See Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566, 30,566 (1988) (to be codified at
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lead in gasoline."
States have also implemented pollutant trading programs, primarily to
address air pollution problems. Regulators in Los Angeles have implemented
the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) to reduce emissions of
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides.8 5 The program initially targeted sources
that emit 95% of the total emissions of nitrogen oxides and 66% of the total
emissions ofsulfurdioxide.16 Regulators projectthatRECLAIMwill costbusi-
nesses 42% less than a traditional command and control program." Under the
tradingprogram, the South CoastAirQualityManagementDistrict(SCAQMD),
the agency that regulates air pollution in the Los Angeles air quality control
region, assigns a finite number of emission credits to the sources, based on
historical emission patterns, and assigns fewer credits to sources each year
until the emissions are capped in 2003 at a level that meets national air qual-
ity standards for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides for the region. Air
40 C.F.R. pt. 82). Congress capped the total number of allowances that EPA distributed in
order to gradually phase out consumption, 42 U.S.C. § 7671b (1994), and imposed an excise
tax on CFC production to prevent windfall profits. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4681, 4682 (1994).
The allowance trading program costs businesses about $2.4 million, as opposed to the
estimated $300 million cost of a command and control approach. See ELIReport, supra note
1, § 6.1.8.
84. In order to reduce the amount of lead in the ambient air, EPA reduced the limit on
the amount of lead in gasoline to an average level of 1.1 gm/gallon by November 1, 1982, 0.5
gm/gallon by July 1, 1985, and 0.1 gn/gallon by January 1, 1986. See ELIReport, supra note
1, § 6.1.9. EPA allowed refineries to create lead credits, which could be allocated to other
refineries for purposes of determining whether the refineries were complying with the lead
limits. Id. For instance, ifRefinerA produced 200 million gallons of gasoline in 1983 with an
average lead content of 0.8 gm/gallon (when the limit was 1.1 gm/gallon), the refiner could earn
60 million grams of lead credits (0.3 gm/gallon times 200 million gallons), which it could sell
to Refiner B, who may have produced 200 million gallons of gasoline with an average lead
content of 1.4 gm/gallon. Id Refiners could bank credits for use until the end of 1987. Id.
Almost 60% of refiners participated in trading and 90% participated in banking by the end of
the program. Id. EPA phased out the use of lead in gasoline much more quickly through
trading than would have been possible under a pure command and control approach. Id.
85. Ozone levels in the Los Angeles area are often twice as high as the national ambient
air quality standards. See id § 6.1.2. Initially, regulators also proposed to include emissions
of certain volatile organic compounds (VOCs) under the trading program. Id Heavy opposi-
tion, coupled with various technical problems, prevented regulators from including VOCs in
the program. Id In 1995, the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD)
proposed to expand the trading program to target various sources of VOC emissions, but the
agency later withdrew that proposal. Id.
86. Regulators initially targeted over 700 sources of nitrogen oxide emissions and 50
sources of sulfur dioxide emissions. See id. When the program was implemented in 1994,
however, it encompassed 370 sources of nitrogen oxides and 40 sources of sulfur dioxide. Id.




pollution sources can trade credits, but the credits can only be used in the year
that they are issued. 9 The SCAQMD also implemented two controversial
initiatives to encourage nitrogen oxide emission reductions. Under one
SCAQMD rule, companies can earn RTCs by buying and scrapping homeown-
ers' gasoline-powered lawn mowers and other garden equipment." The rule
is modeled on another SCAQMD program that allows companies to earn
emission reduction credits by buying and scrapping heavily polluting automo-
biles.91
The Texas Air Control Board administers a trading program for several
pollutants that contribute to ozone pollution in the Houston air quality control
region.92 The program includes an automobile scrapping program similar to
the California program.93
While the state and federal pollutant trading programs promise to reduce
pollution in a "cost-effective" manner, these programs could disparately
impact low-income communities. First, while some trading programs limit
trading to a specific air quality control region, many trading programs do not
include any geographic limits on trades. As a result, while trading programs
may decrease overall pollution levels, they may increase pollution in certain
areas and create "toxic hot spots." Older, heavily polluting industries may
find that it is more cost-effective to continue polluting and to buy pollution
rights than to install newtechnologies to reduce pollution. Thus, communities
surrounding those industries will be exposed to higher levels of pollution than
other communities. Geographic limits on trades will not eliminate the "toxic
hot spot" problem, especially if the geographic area in which trades are
authorized is fairly large, but the limits could, at least, reduce the potential
volume of pollution that will be imparted into a toxic hot spot. Professors
Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart, early advocates of pollutant trading
programs, recognized the "hot spot" problem over a decade ago,94 and recent
89. Id.
90. See Marla Cone, Lawn Mower Buyback Plan Approved, L.A. TIMEs, May 11, 1996,
at A20. Studies suggest that a single lawn mower can emit as much ozone-causing pollution
in 20 hours as a 1996 car emits when it is driven for 26,000 miles. Id
91. Id. Between 1994 and 1996, more than 7000 cars were scrapped underthe auto buy-
back rule. Iad
92. See ELI Report, supra note 1, § 6.1.3.6. The Texas Air Control Board began to
design the program in 1992, and the first trade under the program occurred in July 1995. Id
93. Id. However, while the California program uses mathematical models to determine
the amount of emission reductions that can be earned for each vehicle that is scrapped, the
Texas program assigns emission reduction credits based on the actual emissions of the vehicles
that are scrapped. Id.
94. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1350. Ackerman and Stewart defended
their proposal by arguing that the command and control approach also does not prevent "hot
spots." Id
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commentators93 and the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council
(NEJAC)P echo their concerns today.97
Even without trading programs, "grandfathering" provisions in environ-
mental laws that establish more lenient standards for existing polluters than
for new polluters provide incentives for old, heavily polluting industries to
continue to pollute.9" Trading programs will provide additional incentives for
those facilities to continue to pollute and will perpetuate the distributional
inequities that are already caused, in part, by "grandfathering" provisions."
If the trading programs will create toxic hot spots, economic theory
suggests that the hot spots will most likely occur in low-income communi-
ties."° Low-income communities are disproportionately impacted by air
pollution, 1'' the siting of locally unwanted land uses (LULUs),' 2 and the
95. See Driesen, supra note 1, at 310; Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging
the Gap Between Environmental Laws and "Justice,"47 AM. U. L. REV. 221,269 (1997); Rena
I. Steinzor, Reinventing EnvironmentalRegulation: The Dangerous Journey From Command
to Self-Control, 22 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 103, 115 (1998).
9"6. In a 1995 report, theNEJAC suggested that it would closely monitor the implementa-
tion of pollution trading policies because the policies could encourage inequitable distribution
of pollution in toxic hot spots. See Increased Enforcement Recommended in Minority,
Low-Income Communities, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1554 (Dec. 22, 1995).
97. Critics might argue that the concerns about toxic hot spots are inflated. Trading
schemes are often coupled with command and control standards, so that an industrial source
must meet certain technology-based standards before they can trade for pollution rights. See
ZYGMuNTJ.B. PLATER ETAL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAWAND SOCIETY
748 (2ded. 1998) (illustrating table identifying technology-based airpollution limits that cannot
be avoided through trading). Thus, there are limits on the amount of pollution that will flow
to a toxic hot spot
This criticism is flawed for several reasons. Technology-based standards are notnecessar-
ily designed to protect human health or the environment See id. at 501-03 (contrasting
technology-based standards in Clean Water Act with harm-based standards in Clean Air Act).
Thus, if several sources are emitting pollution into the air or water at levels that meet technology-
based standards in a toxic hot spot, those standards will not necessarily protect the health or
environment of the surrounding community. Although states may impose more stringent limits
on sources in those toxic hot spots in order to meet health-based or environmentally-based water
quality standards or air quality standards, see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(1)(C) (1994), the
health-based or environmentally-based standards do not necessarily protect the health and safety
of communities because the standards are set based on risk assessments that do not address the
cumulative orsynergistic impacts that pollution can have on persons. See Kuehn, supra note40,
at 117-21.
98. See Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, If Your Grandfather Could Pollute, So Can You:
Environmental 'Grandfather Clauses' and TheirRole in Environmental Inequity, 45 CATH. U.
L. REV. 131, 134 (1995); see also Steinzor, supra note 95, at 115-16.
99. See Kaswan, supra note 95, at 270-71; Robertson, supra note 98, at 134, 139.
100. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 40.
102. See supra note 40; see also Andrew Szasz et al., The Demographics ofProximity to
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siting of heavily polluting industries." This trend will likely continue as
pollution trading programs expand for several reasons that are grounded in
economic theory. First, heavily polluting industrial facilities (the facilities
that may purchase pollution credits) will more likely be sited in low-income,
urban areas than in middle- to upper-income, suburban areas. "° Second, low-
income communities may be less likely than affluent communities to urge an
outdated, heavily polluting industry to implement new pollution controls
instead of buying pollution rights. Low-income communities may fear that if
they urge the industry to adopt new pollution controls, then the industry will
close, depriving the community of essential jobs and tax revenue. Finally,
low-income communities often lack the political power to influence industries
to adopt new pollution controls instead of buying pollution rights.'
As trading programs have proliferated, examples of the disparate impacts
of such programs have begun to proliferate as well. For instance, Citizens for
a Better Environment and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund recently chal-
lenged the auto scrapping program of the SCAQMD on the grounds that the
program discriminates against minorities in violation of federal civil rights
laws.' 6 Over the past few years, oil companies have scrapped 17,000 cars to
generate emission reduction credits that enable the companies to avoid install-
ing vapor-recovery systems at oil refineries in low-income, Latino communi-
ties.0 7 The auto scrapping program has, therefore, concentrated thousands of
ToxicReleases: The Case ofLosAngeles County (visitedAug. 21,1998) <http-/www.mapcnizin.
com/scruztri/docs/seek55.htm>.
103. See OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND ToxIcs, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ToxmCs RELEASE INVENTORY & EMIssION REDUCTIONS 1987-1990 r THE LOWER
MIssIssIPPIRvERINDusTRALCORRiDOR25 (1993); LOUISLANAADviSORYCOMM.TOTHEU.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGiHTS, THE BATTLE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN LOUISIANA...
GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY, AND THE PEOPLE 8 (1993); Controversial Report on Health Effects
in Poor Areas of Tennessee Released by EPA, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1468 (Dec. 3, 1993);
Review of64 Previous Studies Confirms Conclusions on Pollution's Impact on Poor, 25 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 22 (May 6, 1994); Dr. Andrew Szasz & Michael R. Meuser, Environmental
Inequality: Silicon Valley Toxics andDemographics (visited Aug. 8,1998) <http://www.cruzio.
com/~meuser/EI/project.html>.
104. See sources cited supra note 103.
105. The limited political poweroflow-income communities is illustrated mostdramatically
by a passage in a 1984 study on the siting of waste incinerators prepared by Cerrell Associates
for the CaliforniaWaste ManagementBoard. See Kaswan, supra note 95, at 236-37. Thestudy
concluded that "all socioeconomic groupings tend to resent the nearby siting of major facilities,
but middle and upper socioeconomic strata possess better resources to effectuate their opposi-
tion. Middle and highersocioeconomic strataneighborhoods should notfall withinthe one-mile
and five-mile radius of the proposed site." Id. at 23 6-37; see Robertson, supra note 98, at 165.
106. See Greg Goldin, Credit Crash: State Enters Fray over Swapping of Pollution
Credits, L.A. WEEKLY, Sept. 12, 1997, at 14.
107. Id.
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pounds of pollution that were previously dispersed throughout the air quality
control region, into several low-income, minority communities."0 8
Future pollutant trading programs may create additional toxic hot spots
if regulators do not design the programs to prevent such inequities. In the next
few years, the sulfur dioxide trading program will expand significantly,'" and
several major pollutant trading programs may be launched.
Eleven northeastern states and the District of Columbia ° have agreed to
implement a pollutant trading program, beginning in 1999, to reduce emis-
sions of nitrogen oxides from utilities and industrial boilers."' EPA is devel-
oping a rule that would establish a similar cap and trade program to reduce
nitrogen oxide emissions in the thirty-seven states that are located east of the
Mississippi River.' Both proposals include an overall cap on emissions but
108. In response to the challenge of Citizens for a Better Environment, the SCAQMD
adopted a ten-point plan to prevent toxic hot spots in minority communities. See South Coast
Air District Adopts Environmental Justice Program, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1265 (Oct. 24,
1997). The ten-point plan created a new monitoring system to evaluate the cumulative impacts
of emissions from multiple sources, required the agency to conduct a comprehensive 15-month
study regarding the distributional impacts of pollution in the region and to hold a series of town
hall meetings to improve public access to the agency, and created a task force of business,
environmental, and community representatives to address environmental justice issues in air
pollution regulation. Id
109. Phase II of the sulfur dioxide emissions trading program, which begins in 2000, will
involve 700 additional sources, and experts are forecasting increased trading by sources in
Phase II. See ELIReport, supra note 1, § 6.1.7.
110. The 11 states and the District of Columbia are members of an "Ozone Transport
Commission" that was created by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments to formulate consensus
recommendations to control ozone pollution in the states. See 42 U.S.C. § 751 1c(a) (1994).
111. The agreement divides the states into three "zones," which must achieve different
nitrogen dioxide reduction levels from 1999 through 2003. See ELI Report, supra note 1,
§ 6.1.5. The agreement specifies the number of emission allowances that are allocated to each
state, and the states determine the manner in which allowances will be distributed within each
state. Id. Allowances can be traded or banked by sources in the state. Id Several northeastern
states have already created nitrogen oxide cap and trade programs to implement the agreenent.
See, e.g., Biggest Planned Northeast Nox Trade Preparing Region for 1999, Traders Say, 28
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1336 (Nov. 7, 1997) (describing Massachusetts's program); State Proposes
Market-BasedPlan to Slash Power Plant Nox Emissions, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1006 (Sept. 26,
1997) (describingNew Jersey's program). The Ozone Transport Commission estimates thatthe
trading program will cost 30% less than a pure command and control approach. See ELIReport,
supra note 1, § 6.1.5.
112. In 1995, EPA created an Ozone TransportAssessment Group (OTAG), with represen-
tatives of those 37 states and the District of Columbia, to review potential controls to limit
ozone formation in the region. See ELI Report, supra note 1, § 6.1.5. Based on OTAG
recommendations, EPA issued proposed rules to cap nitrogen oxide emissions from each state
in the region and to establish a nitrogen oxide emissions trading program for the region. See
Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport
Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg.
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neither imposes any geographic limit on pollutant trades within the areas
covered by the program. Accordingly, both programs have the potential to
create pollution hot spots.
When the federal and state governments complete the ongoing restructur-
ing of electric power transmission regulation, heavily polluting, outdated
power plants may have additional incentives to continue operating and creat-
ing toxic hot spots. In 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) began a process that will require utilities to provide open access, non-
discriminatory transmission services over their power lines."' This will allow
utilities to deliver power to a wider distribution area and, presumably, lead to
more cost-efficient energy production.' EPA and public interest groups
criticized the proposal because it could increase the market for older, heavily
polluting power plants and could encourage utilities to continue operating
those plants." 5 Accordingly, the proposal could lead to the creation of toxic
hot spots of pollution around the power plants"6 and downwind from the
60,318 (proposed Nov. 7, 1997). Midwestern and southern states are lobbying strongly against
the proposal, see Governors Offer Ozone Transport Proposal, Ask Clinton toRethinkAdminis-
tration Plan, 28 Env'tRep. (BNA) 2381 (Mar. 13, 1998), while northeastern states are strongly
supporting it. See Northeast Governors Press Clinton to Move.Forwardwith Ozone Proposal,
28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2717 (Apr. 24, 1998). While EPA planned to finalize the rule by
September 1998, legislation has been introduced to delay the implementation of the rule, and
political pressure may derail the proposal. See Legislation WouldDelay Promulgation ofEPA
Rule Addressing Ozone Transport, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2510 (Apr. 3, 1998).
113. See Order 888: Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory TransmissionServices byPublic Utilities; Recovery ofStrandedCosts byPublic
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 75 FERC 61,080 (1996) (visited Aug. 6, 1998) <http:ll
www.ferc.fed.us/newsl/rules/data/rm95-8-OOV.txt>.
114. Id.
115. EPA raised its concerns in the context of the environmental review procedures of the
National Environmental Policy Act. See Air Quality Could Be Lowered by Proposal to In-
crease Utility Competition, EPA Says, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 859 (Sept. 1, 1995). The Center
for Clean Air Policy concluded that, without a cap on nitrogen oxide emissions, FERC's open
access rules would increase emissions by 11-18% in New York during the summer ozone
season. See Study Says Increased Utility Competition Will Boost Ozone in East Absent Con-
trols, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2339 (Apr. 4, 1997). Public utilities in several northeastern states
raised similar concerns to FERC and requested a rehearing on FERC's decision to allow open
access. See Order 888-A: Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services byPublic Utilities; Recovery ofStrandedCosts byPublic
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities (Order on Rehearing), 78 FERC 61,220 (1997) (visited Aug.
6,1998) <http://www.ferc.fed.us/newsl/rules/data/rm95-8p1-000.txt> [hereinafterOrder888-A].
116. A recent EPA report concludes that utilities emit between 13-26% ofthe total airborne
emissions of mercury. See Utility Air Toxics Report Highlights Mercury as Pollutant of
Concern, Lists Other HAPs, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2285 (Feb. 27, 1998). Studies have sug-
gested that mercury can cause death, can cause reduced reproductive success, can impair growth
and development and cause behavioral abnormalities in wildlife, and may cause neurological
and developmental defects in humans. Id. at 2286. In light of those findings, EPA used author-
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plants.'17 FERC prepared an environmental impact statement for its proposal
and concluded that the open access rule would not result in significant overall
increases in nitrogen oxide emissions and that EPA should address any dis-
tributional inequities or other environmental concerns through EPA's nitrogen
oxide strategy under the Clean Air Act."' Utilities are lobbying Congress to
include air pollution controls in electricity deregulation legislation," 9 and the
Clinton Administration recently announced plans for electric utility restructur-
ing legislation that would establish a national nitrogen oxide trading emissions
open trading program. 2o
The Clinton Administration might also seek legislation to establish a
trading program to reduce carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emis-
sions.'' The Administration plans to sign the Kyoto Protocol to the United
ity under Section 114 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (1994), to require utilities to
monitor and report mercury levels in the coal that they bum. Agency Information Collection
Activities: Proposed Collection; Comment Request; Electric Utility Steam Generating Unit
Mercury Emissions Collection Effort, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,406 (1998) (proposed Apr. 9, 1998).
EPA is trying to determine whether it is necessary to regulate mercury emissions from utilities.
Id. at 17,407.
117. Although it is hard to predict what areas would be impacted by nitrogen oxide
emissions from old, heavily polluting power plants, it is likely thatthe pollutants will exacerbate
problems in cities and urban areas where there are other sources of ozone pollution, rather than
in suburban communities. Studies have consistently determined that air pollution disparately
impacts low-income communities. See Charles Lee, Developing the Vision of Environmental
Justice: A Paradigm forAchieving Healthy and Sustainable Communities, 14 VA. ENvTL. L.J.
571, 573 (1995); see also Hearings on Environmental Justice Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights, supra note 40.
118. See Order 888-A, supra note 115, at 1.17. The Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) mediated the dispute between EPA and FERC. See EPA-FERC Battle Over Utility
Access Rule Resolved Under Referral Process, CEQ Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 463 (June 21,
1996).
119. SeeEnvironmental Group, N.J. UtilityAgree onRole ofPollution Control in Restruc-
turing, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2421 (Mar. 20, 1998). Legislation introduced in the 105th
Congress would impose caps on emissions of nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, carbon dioxide,
and mercury from power plants. See S. 687, 105th Cong. (1997).
120. See Electric RestructuringPlan Seeks Efficiency Through Renewable Energy, Market
Trading, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2461 (Mar. 27,1998). Environmental groups criticized the plan
because it did not include caps on emissions of carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and sulfur
dioxide. Id In response to concerns that FERC's open access rules will encourage older,
heavily polluting power plants to continue to operate, Clinton Administration officials argue
that such plants would be operated at full capacity regardless of the rules. See Energy Official
Says Utility Competition Unlikely to Boost Old Plants ' Emissions, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2672
(Apr. 17, 1998).
121. See EPA May Seek More Authority for Trading Through Utility Restructuring
Legislation, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2382 (Mar. 13, 1998); Administration Plans to Sign Kyoto
Deal, Will Hold Off Seeking Senate Ratification, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2152 (Feb. 20, 1998)
[hereinafter Kyoto Dealn.
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Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change1" and believes that a
trading program would enable the United States to reduce its greenhouse gas
emissions to the levels required by the treaty in a cost-effective manner."
In addition to air pollution emissions trading programs, EPA and states
are expected to establish more water pollution effluent trading programs. In
order to encourage states to adopt trading programs, EPA recently issued
a Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading." Polluters would still
have to meet applicable technology-based water pollution standards under
the trading programs."z However, polluters could avoid reducing their
pollution discharges beyond technology-based limits to meet limits that are
necessary to protect water quality 26 by entering into agreements with other
122. In December 1997,160 countries reached agreement on the Protocol, which addresses
emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur
hexafluoride. See Negotiators in Japan Reach Agreement for 6 Percent Emission Cut by
2008-2012, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1565 (Dec. 12, 1997) [hereinafter Agreement]. Before the
United States signs the treaty, the Clinton Administration hopes to enter into bilateral agree-
ments with several developing nations in order to appease members ofCongress who were upset
that developing nations are not required to meet emission limits in the treaty. See Kyoto Deal,
supra note 121, at 2152; White House Plans to Seek Emission Cuts in Developing Countries
Before Pact Ratified, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1615 (Dec. 19, 1997).
While developing countries do not have to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, the
treaty allows industrialized countries to sponsor and receive credit for projects that reduce
emissions levels in developing countries. See Agreement, supra, at 1565. The treaty also
allows countries to claim credits for maintaining forests because forests can function as "sinks"
for greenhouse gas emissions. Id Japan is currently negotiating with Russia to exchange
energy efficient technologies for emission reduction credits attributable to Russia's vast forestry
resources. See Japan Eyes Greenhouse Gas Trades with Russia to Meet Pact Reductions, 28
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2106 (Feb. 13, 1998).
123. The treaty requires the United States to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 7%
less than 1990 levels by 2008-2012. See Agreement, supra note 122, at 1565. The Clinton
Administration believes that the United States can achieve these reductions primarily by
entering into agreements with developing countries to reduce emissions in those countries
instead of implementing stringent measures to reduce emissions in the United States. See White
House Analysis Call Cost ofKyoto Protocol Reductions Modest, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 729, 729
(Aug. 7, 1998).




126. The Clean Water Act requires polluters to comply with certain water quality-based
standards in addition to technology-based standards. For instance, the Clean Water Act
authorizes the agency that issues NPDES water pollution permits to require polluters to reduce
their pollution discharges beyond the levels required by technology-based standards if the
additional reductions are necessary to meet water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(1)(C)
(1994). In addition, the Clean WaterAct requires states to identify the total amount of'pollution
that may be discharged into certain heavily polluted waters (the "total maximum daily load" or
TMDL) and to limit discharges by all polluters to ensure that pollution discharges do not exceed
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polluters, which then must reduce their pollution discharges beyond levels
required by law."7 Assume, for instance, that a sewage treatment plant and
several farms are located in the watershed of the Mercer River' and that the
river is polluted by excess nutrients. In an effluent trading program, the
sewage treatment plant could enter into an agreement with the farms instead
of installing expensive pollution controls to reduce its own nutrient dis-
charges. The farms would then agree to change their farming practices to
reduce overall nutrient discharges. A few states and local governments have
implemented effluent trading programs,'29 and EPA hopes that its "frame-
work" for trading will encourage more governments to implement similar
programs. " Consequently, to the extent that pollutant trading programs
disparately impact low-income communities, those inequities may be com-
pounded in the near future as regulators launch the new trading initiatives
described in this Part.
B. Pollution Taxes, Fees, and Charges and Their Potential
Disparate Impacts
Pollution taxes, fees, and charges' promise to reduce pollution in cost-
effective ways similar to pollutant trading programs. However, thus far, the
federal government and state governments have been reluctant to take advan-
tage of those tools.'
the water's TMDL. Id. § 1313(d). Additional pollution reductions may be required to comply
with EPA's "antidegradation" policy. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (1997).
127. Several types of trading are possible in effluent trading programs. A point source
polluter may enter into an agreement with another point source or with a nonpoint source. See
Framework, supra note 124, Exec. Summ. Two nonpoint sources may enter into an agreement.
Ma Several discharges from a single point source might be treated as a single discharge in the
same way that air pollution emissions are "bubbled." Id Finally, a pretreatment plant may enter
into an agreement with polluters that dispose of their pollution in the pretreatment plant. Id4
128. Usually, effluent trades can only be made by polluters in the same watershed. See
Framework, supra note 124, at 2-8 (describing "Principles for Trading"). This should reduce
the potential for environmental injustice to some extent.
129. Wisconsin has implemented aprogram that allows pollutersto tradebiological oxygen
demand (BOD) effluent reduction credits on the Fox River. See ELI Report, supra note I,
§ 6.2.2. Regulators in Denver, Colorado have implemented a phosphorous trading program for
the Dillon Reservoir. d § 6.2.3.1.
130. EPA concluded that the use of water pollution effluent trading was limited, in the
past, by the absence of clear and unambiguous authorization for trading in the Clean Water Act.
See GAO REINVENTION REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 3:5:4.
131. Taxes are designed to raise revenue, while charges or fees operate to offset costs to
government. See ELIReport, supra note 1, § 4.1.
132. See ELI Tax Report, supra note 23, at 2. There are several reasons why governments
have been reluctant to use taxes to achieve environmental protection. First, it is politically
difficult to enact pollution taxes because the regulated community usually opposes such taxes,
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The federal government has used pollution taxes to phase out the produc-
tion of various chlorofluorocarbons'33 and to encourage auto makers to
manufacture fuel-efficient cars. 34 The federal government has also consid-
ered adopting a carbon tax, or other energy tax, to spur energy conservation
and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.'35 However, most pollution taxes,
charges, and fees have been implemented by states rather than by the federal
government. 36 The Clean Air Act specifically endorses pollution taxes as a
tool for states to comply with national air quality standards. 137
Some states have imposed fees on the sale of tires 38 or fertilizers139 in
order to finance the cleanup of improper tire disposal sites and the inspection
of fertilizers. Several states impose variable fees on polluters for water
pollution permits 4' or air pollution permits' 4' based on the volume or toxicity
especially if the taxes will be set high enough to materially change behavior. See ELIReport,
supra note 1, § 3.3.1; Thompson, supra note 3, at 18. Second, regulators have less control over
the total volume of pollution that is discharged under a pollution tax system than under a
"capped" pollutant trading program. See ELIReport, supra note 1, § 3.3.1. Third, administra-
tion ofapollution tax system raises numerous complicated issues. For instance, regulators must
determine an appropriate tax rate that encourages pollution reduction, raises revenue, protects
viability of businesses, and possibly achieves several other conflicting policy goals. See ELI
TaxReport, supra note 23, at 9; Ottinger & Moore, supra note 23, at 107. Measurement ofthe
pollution that will be taxed is often difficult. See ELIReport, supra note 1, § 3.4. Finally, some
environmentalists oppose pollution taxes because they appear to give polluters aright to pollute.
l §3.3.1.
133. 26 U.S.C. § 4681 (1994). CFC consumption fell from 318,000 metric tons in 1989
to 200,000 metric tons in 1990, and the tax raised $2.9 billion in its first five years. See ELI
Report, supra note 1, § 4.5.1.3.
134. Manufacturers must pay a tax, ranging from $1000 to $7700, depending on fuel
efficiency, for each car that they sell that averages less than 22.5 miles per gallon. See ELI
Report, supra note 1, § 4.5.1.2.
135. See, e.g., H.R 4805, 101st Cong. (1990); Christian, supra note 23; Dawn Erlandson,
The Btu Tax Experience: What Happened and Why It Happened, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 173
(1994); see also Stavins, supra note 5, at 23.
136. See ELI Report, supra note 1, § 4.1.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (1994).
138. ELI Report, supra note 1, § 4.5.2.1.
139. Id. § 4.5.2.2.
140. Eighteen states that administer the Clean Water Act Section 402 (NPDES) permit
program assess permit fees based on discharge volume, and ten other states assess fees based
on discharge volume and toxicity. See id. § 4.2.2. For instance, permit fees in Louisiana range
from $227.50 to $90,000 and are based on a variety of factors, including pollutants released,
heat load, volume, complexity of the discharger, and potential public health threat of the
discharge. Id. § 4.2.3. In California, fees range from $400 to $10,000 per year and depend on
both the threat to water quality from the discharge and the complexity of the permit. IL
141. Maine imposes an air pollution permit fee that ranges from $2 per ton (for emissions
up to 1000 tons) to $15 per ton (for emissions in excess of 4000 tons), and the state imposes a
surcharge based on the toxicity of emissions. See id. § 4.3.1.1. New Mexico charges permit
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ofthe pollution authorized by the permit. Municipalities often adopt a similar
approach when they establish fees for persons or businesses that dispose of
wastewater in a sewage treatment plant. "" While those fees provide some
incentive for polluters to reduce their pollution, the primary purpose for most
fees is to raise revenue to cover the costs of administering the permit or the
regulatory program.143
By contrast, many municipalities are implementing variable waste dis-
posal fees, a pollution tax system that primarily aims to reduce pollution
rather than to raise revenue.' In a variable rate waste disposal program,
residents pay variable waste disposal fees, which depend on the amount of
waste that they dispose, instead of paying uniform fees. 145 This creates an
incentive for residents to reduce the amount of waste that they generate.
Waste disposal rates have been reduced significantly in cities that have imple-
mented variable rate waste disposal fees.
1 46
While variable rate waste disposal fees, energy taxes, and other pollution
taxes, fees, and charges promise to reduce pollution in cost-effective ways,
they can also perpetuate environmental injustices. First, if governments
impose uniform tax rates on pollution discharges based on the volume or tox-
icity of the discharge without regard to the location of the discharge, pollution
taxes could create toxic hot spots in the same manner as pollutant trading
systems.' 47 It may be more cost-effective for old, heavily polluting industries
to pay pollution taxes than to reduce their pollution discharges, especially
when the taxes are not set at rates that force polluters to reduce pollution. ,
Unless governments tax pollution in heavily polluted areas at a higher rate
than pollution in other areas, only newer, cleaner industries will have any
incentive to reduce their pollution.
fees that range from $10 per ton for criteria pollutants to $150 per ton for air toxics. Id. § 4.3.1.
142. See id. § 4.2.1.
143. Id. § 4.2.3. The 1990 Clean AirActAmendmentsrequire states to imposepermitfees
that recover the administrative costs of operating the air pollution permitting program. See 42
U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(3)(A) (1994).
144. Variable rate ("pay as you throw") programs have been implemented in 3400 commu-
nities in 37 states. See ELIReport, supra note 1, § 4.4.1.
145. Id.
146. A study of 21 northeastern cities that implemented variable rate programs found
that waste disposal rates dropped from 17% to 74% in those cities. Id A 1992 survey of 14
cities found that the waste disposal rates dropped an average of 44% in those cities. Id At the
same time, though, these programs can create incentives for illegal waste disposal ("midnight
dumping"). Id
147. See Ottinger & Moore, supra note 23, at 108.
148. In the past, pollution taxes have generally been set too low to create any significant
incentives for pollution reduction. See ELIReport, supra note 1, § 3.4.
149. See ELI Tax Report, supra note 23, at 9, 26.
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More significantly, though, pollution taxes could have regressive effects
on low-income communities. 50 For instance, low-income households would
feel the impacts of an energy tax much more keenly than high-income house-
holds because low-income households spend a greater proportion of their
income on heat, electricity, and gasoline than high-income households.'
Similarly, variable-rate waste disposal fees impose more significant financial
burdens on low-income residents than high-income residents.'52 At least one
commentator has suggested that low-income communities should bear a
greater proportional share of pollution reduction costs because those commu-
nities will receive the greatest benefit from pollution reductions.'53 Following
that logic one step further, though, shouldn't the communities that benefitted
from the existing inequitable distribution of pollution be taxed for those
benefits? Couldn't that money be used to compensate the communities that
have endured heavier pollution burdens? More sensitive commentators have
suggested that more progressive pollution taxes could be structured at differ-
ent rates" or coupled with subsidies or other companion measures.' 55
While governments may increasingly turn to pollution taxes, fees, and
charges in the future,'5 6 they should structure such programs to avoid these
potential inequitable impacts.
C. Project XL and Brownfields Programs
Project XL is another market-based reform that could disparately impact
low-income communities. Through Project XL, which stands for "excellence
in leadership," EPA has committed to approve fifty pilot projects to examine
innovative ways to achieve environmental and public health protection in a
more cost-effective manner.'57 In Project XL, EPA enters into agreements with
polluters that authorize the polluters to avoid certain regulatory and legal re-
quirements ifthepolluters canoperatetheirbusinesses in amannerthatachieves
"superior environmental results" while meeting certain other criteria.' EPA
150. See Dower & Repetto, supra note 25, at 167-69.
151. See Christian, supra note 23, at 250.
152. See ELI Report, supra note 1, § 4.4.1.
153. See Dower & Repetto, supra note 25, at 169.
154. See Christian, supra note 23, at 253-54.
155. See id at 252-53; Ottinger & Moore, supra note 23, at 118.
156. See ELI Tax Report, supra note 23, at 46-47; Stavins, supra note 5, at 23.
157. See Environmental ProtectionAgency XLataGlance(visitedAug. 6, 1998)<http://
yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xlhome.nsf/al/xl.glance> [hereinafterXL ata Glance]. Some states are
also modeling initiatives on EPA's Project XL. See Steinzor, supra note 95, at 111.
158. See XL at a Glance, supra note 157.
To participate in Project XL, applicants must have a good history of compliance
with EPA regulations. Successful XL proposals must also develop alternative
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hopes that the initiative will stimulate regulatory flexibility and will create
models for future reforms.
15 9
In a Project XL pilot project, EPA might (a) authorize emissions trading,
caps, or bubbles that are not otherwise authorized by law; 6° (b) waive permit
or reporting requirements or procedures to allow businesses to consolidate
permits or reports;16 1 or (c) allow businesses to comply with performance
standards instead of applicable technology-based standards. 62
EPA waives or modifies regulatory and legal requirements in Project XL
pilot projects in order to achieve environmental protection in a more cost-
effective manner. However, these waivers may actually increase pollution in
the communities surrounding the pilot project because determining whether
a project produces "superior environmental results" is a very subjective task.
First, it is difficult to calculate baseline pollution levels in order to determine
whether a project increases or decreases pollution. Second, Project XL
pilot projects may decrease discharges of one pollutant but increase the
production of another pollutant, or the projects may transfer pollution from
one medium to another." 4 While the project might seem, initially, to produce
"superior environmental results," it could aggravate health or environmental
impacts to the surrounding community because of the synergistic or cumula-
tive impacts of the new pollutant or new discharge, coupled with existing
pollution. 65 Those impacts might not be apparent without detailed study and
analysis.
To the extent that Project XL pilot projects will increase pollution levels
in particular communities, it is likely that the projects will disparately impact
environmental management strategies that: (1) produce superior environmental
results...; (2) produce benefits such as cost savings, paperwork reduction [and]
regulatoryflexibility.. .; (3) are supported by stakeholders; (4) achieve innova-
tion/pollution prevention; (5)... are transferable to other facilities; (6) are feasible;
(7) establish accountability through agreed upon methods ofmonitoring, reporting,
and evaluations; and (8) avoid shifting the risk burden ....
Id.
159. See Beth S. Ginsberg& Cynthia Cummis, EPA'sProjectXL: A ParadigmforProm-
ising Regulatory Reform, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,059, 10,061 (Feb. 1996).
160. Id.; see Environmental Protection Agency, Status of OSi Specialties Project XL (last
modified July 20, 1998) <http://yosemite.epa.go/xllxl_home.nsf/all/osi.html> (describing
Project XL pilot project for OSi Specialties Incorporated plant in West Virginia).
161. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, Weyerhauser Proposes Multimedia
Approach to EnvironmentalProtection (last modifiedApr. 23,1997) <http:llyosemite.epa.gov/
xl/xl_home.nsf/allweyer.html> (describing Project XL pilot project for Weyerhauser pulp
manufacturing plant in Oglethorpe, Georgia).
162. See Ginsberg & Cummis, supra note 159, at 10,061.
163. See id. at 10,062; Steinzor, supra note 95, at 131-32.
164. See Steinzor, supra note 95, at 133-34.
165. Id.
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low-income communities. Project XL pilot projects are developed through a
very time-consuming, technical process, and the projects involve detailed
analyses of industrial processes and economics. While affluent communities
will be able to hire consultants and experts to evaluate and to comment on the
pilot project proposals or to challenge the validity ofthe agency's agreements,
it will be more difficult for lower-income communities to shoulder those
expenses.'6 As a result, to the extent that the Project XL pilot project devel-
opment process frustrates the ability of low-income communities to participate
in the process, it is more likely that EPA will enter into Project XL agree-
ments that increase pollution in low-income communities rather than in
affluent communities. However, potential disparate impacts of Project XL
may not be a major concern for any communities because the program has not
been very successful thus far. 67
Brownfields 16' redevelopment initiatives may raise some of the same
concerns as Project XL pilot projects regarding inequitable treatment of com-
166. Public interest groups and other commentators have criticized Project XL's public
participation procedures because they fail to provide communities with financial or technical
assistance that is necessary to participate in the process and because much of the negotiations
to develop the agreements takes place without public participation. See EPA's ProjectXL in
Need ofAdjustments to Ease Participation, Forum Participants Assert, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA)
1839 (Jan. 3, 1997) [hereinafter XL Forum]; see also Steinzor, supra note 95, at 142-43;
Thompson, supra note 3, at 14, 16.
167. Although EPA hopes to approve 50 pilot projects, the agency only approved 7 as of
April 1998. See XL ata Glance, supra note 157. There are several reasons why the agency has
not approved more pilot projects. First, EPA has found it difficult to determine whether
proposed projects achieve "superior environmental performance" orto develop aprecise defini-
tion of "superior environmental performance." See Steinzor, supra note 95, at 130.
Second, negotiation and development of Project XL pilot project agreements is time-
consuming and expensive for EPA, businesses, and communities. See GAO REINVENTION
REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 4.2; Steinzor, supra note 95, at 128; Thompson, supra note 3, at 16;
XL Forum, supra note 166.
Finally, by their very nature, Project XL pilots may violate statutory or regulatory
requirements. See Ginsberg & Cummis, supra note 159, at 10,063. While EPA can decide, as
a matter of enforcement discretion, not to prosecute Project XL participants for statutory or
regulatory violations, citizens may be able to challenge the pilot projects through citizen suit
provisions of the environmental laws. Id
EPA has attempted to address that problem by using permit modifications, site-specific
rulemakings, and alternative compliance strategies as ways to exercise their discretion, when
the environmental laws grant EPA discretion, to modify regulatory requirements. See Notice
of Modifications, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,872, 19,876 (1997) (notice issued Apr. 23, 1997). While
EPA feels that it has authority to implement many of the Project XL pilot projects under
existing laws, see GAO REINvENTiON REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 3:5. 1, legislators have intro-
duced legislation that would explicitly authorize EPA to waive or modify statutory or regulatory
requirements for Project XL pilot projects. See S. 1348, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 3180, 105th
Cong. (1998).
168. "Brownfields" are defined by EPA as "abandoned, idled or underused industrial and
commercial facilities where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 111 (1999)
munities. Through EPA's Brownfields Action Agenda and state voluntary
cleanup programs, the federal government and state governments are provid-
ing liability limitations," grants, loans, tax breaks, 7 ' and other economic
incentives to developers to encourage them to clean up and to redevelop
property that has been contaminated by toxic or hazardous substances.' In
many cases, regulators encourage developers to redevelop property by stream-
lining the cleanup process for the contaminated property or by establishing
site-specific cleanup standards for the property."
Critics of EPA's Brownfields Agenda and state voluntary cleanup
programs (collectively referred to as "brownfields programs") argue that the
streamlined, site-specific cleanup standards provide less protection to public
health and the environment than standards that would otherwise apply to the
cleanup of the property.' Most brownfields properties are located in inner-
city communities, ratheir than in suburban or rural communities. 4 Accord-
ingly, critics argue that brownfields programs could force inner-city communi-
ties to accept substandard environmental cleanups.
On the other hand, critics of Superfund often assert that Superfund clean-
up standards are unnecessarily overprotective. 75 EPA defends brownfields
programs by pointing out that (a) cleanup standards under those programs
must, at a minimum, protect human health 76 and (b) most brownfields proper-
ties would not be cleaned up at all without a brownfields program.'77 In addi-
tion, the redevelopment can revitalize the communities and bring back busi-
nesses andjobs."' Accordingly, many environmental justice advocates praise
environmental contamination." Office ofSolid Waste andEmergency Response, Environmental
Protection Agency, Brownfields Glossary of Terms: Brownfields (last modified Sept. 30,1997)
<http://www.epa.gov/swerospslbf/glossary.htm>. The GovernmentAccounting Office estimates
that there may be as many as 500,000 brownfields in the United States. Stephen M. Johnson,
The Brownflelds Action Agenda: A Modelfor Future Federal/State Cooperation in the Quest
for Environmental Justice?, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 85, 94 (1996).
169. See Johnson, supra note 168, at 102, 105.
170. Id. at 104, 112-15.
171. Without incentives, uncertain cleanup standards, uncertain liability, and inadequate
financing opportunities often prevent the redevelopment of brownfields. let at 97-100.
172. Id. at 103.
173. Id. at 96.
174. Id. at 94.
175. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Facing a Time ofCounter-Revolution- The Kepone Incident
and a Review of First Principles, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 696 (1995) (discussing "Cadillac
cleanups"); see also PERCIVAL, supra note 1, at 393-99; Peter Huber, Crime: Buck-Passing,
FORBES, Mar. 14, 1994, at 120.
176. See Johnson, supra note 168, at 95-96.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 95.
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brownfields programs. ' At the same time, though, most caution that brown-
fields programs can only protect and revitalize communities if the communi-
ties are provided with opportunities for "full and informed" participation in
the cleanup and redevelopment process.180
III. Market-Based Reforms That Facilitate Environmental Justice
Although many of the market-based reforms that have been instituted
could exacerbate problems of environmental injustice, a few reforms could
potentially reduce inequities. Pollution prevention and multimedia initiatives
hold the most promise for environmental justice. 8'
Instead of regulating the manner in which pollution is managed or
disposed after it is created, pollution prevention initiatives attempt to reduce
pollution atthe source 82 and prevent businesses from creating pollution in the
first place.'83 It is appropriate to label pollution prevention as a market-based
reform because pollution prevention practices can save businesses millions of
dollars, enable businesses to operate more efficiently, and facilitate the reduc-
tion of waste.'"
179. It at 95-96.
180. Id at96, 100. Ina 1996 report, theNational Environmental Justice Advisory Council
stressed the importance of public participation and recommended several other improvements
to brownfields initiatives that would foster environmental justice. See WAsTE AND FACILITY
SmING SUBCOMMITTEE, NATIONAL ENvIRONMENTAL JusTIcE ADVISORY COUNcL, ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENvIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, URBAN REVITALIZATION, AND
BROWNFIELDS: THE SEARCH FORAUTHENTIC SIGNS OFHOPE 20-28, 29-56 (EPA-500-R-96-002)
(1996).
181. For a good discussion of the history of federal and state pollution prevention efforts,
see generally Robert F. Blomquist, Government's Role RegardingIndustrialPollutionPreven-
tion in the United States, 29 GA. L. REV. 349 (1995).
182. "Source reduction" refers to any practice that "reduces the amount of any hazard-
ous substance, pollutant or contaminant entering any waste stream or otherwise released into
the environment ... prior to recycling, treatment, or disposal and ... reduces the hazards to
public health and the environment associated with the release of such substances, pollutants
or contaminants." 42 U.S.C.§ 13102(5)(A) (1994). "Source reduction" does not include re-
cycling.
183. Pollution prevention practices that businesses could implement include: (a) changes
in process inputs; (b) improved plant management or housekeeping; (c) changes in process
equipment or process technology; (d) recycling and reuse within a process; and (e) changes in
the design of end products. See Stephen M. Johnson, From Reaction to Proaction: The 1990
Pollution Prevention Act, 17 COLUM. J. ENvmL. L. 153, 157 (1992) [hereinafter Johnson II].
184. See Environmental Protection Agency, Pollution Prevention 1997: A National
Progress Report, Exec. Summ.:2 (1997) (visited Aug. 8, 1998) <http:llwww.epa.gov/opptintr/
p2_97/execsumm.pdf' [hereinafterProgress Report]; Johnson II, supra note 183, at 157 n.21,
161 n.43, 162 n.44 (citing economic success stories for Dow Chemical, 3M, Chevron, and
Clairol); see also Kurt A. Strasser, Preventing Pollution, 8 FORDHAM ENVrL. L.J. 1,11 (1996).
Businesses save money by reducing or avoiding waste disposal costs and by avoiding waste of
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At the same time, pollution prevention initiatives can reduce the amount
of toxic substances in the environment, reduce worker exposure to toxic
substances, reduce the potential for accidents and spills in transporting toxics,
and reduce the amount of toxic substances in consumer products." 5 The
"environmental justice" benefits of pollution prevention are obvious. Ifpollu-
tion prevention initiatives actually reduce pollution, they reduce the likelihood
that low-income communities will be disparately impacted by cumulative or
synergistic exposure to multiple pollutants. EPA considers pollution preven-
tion to be the most effective tool for battling environmental injustice.'86
Congress enacted the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 to encourage bus-
inesses to adopt pollution prevention measures. Because legislators believed
that mandatory pollution prevention requirements would stifle innovation,"8 7
the Pollution Prevention Act focuses on providing information,
88 grants, 8 9
and other incentives to encourage voluntary pollution prevention.' EPA has
launched dozens of initiatives aimed at encouraging voluntary pollution
raw materials. See Johnson II, supra note 183, at 158. Amoco recently concluded that pollu-
tion prevention approaches at one of its refineries could eliminate as much pollution as required
by command and control regulations for one-fourth the cost of the regulations. See Strasser,
supra, at 9. A Dow Chemical study concluded that the company received a 50% return on
funds that they spent on pollution prevention, while they only received a 13% return on funds
that they spent on regulatory compliance. See id. A study by New Jersey's environmental
regulators concluded that five to eight dollars are saved for every dollar that government and
industry spend on pollution prevention. See Pollution Prevention Planning Reported to Save
Industry $5-S8for Each Dollar Spent, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 671 (Aug. 4, 1995). Pollution
prevention approaches were used to remove phosphates from household detergents, see Strasser,
supra, at 27-29, and are being used to remove chlorine from paper manufacturing processes.
See Louisiana-Pacific Kraft Paper Mill Converts to Chlorine-Free Operation, 25 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 866 (Sept. 9, 1994).
185. See Progress Report, supra note 184, Exec. Summ.:2; Johnson I, supra note 183, at
162. Pollution prevention plays a prominent role in the Principles of Environmental Justice
adopted at the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Conference in 199 1.
See PROCEEDINGS, THE FIRST NATIONAL PEOPLE OF COLOR ENvIRONMENTAL LEADERSHP
SUMMIT: THE WASHINGTON COURT ON CAPITOL HILL, WASHINGTON, D.C., OCT. 24-27; 1991
xiii-xiv (Charles Lee ed., 1992) (listing seventeen Principles of Environmental Justice adopted
at United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice sponsored summit).
186. See Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Justice Through Pollution
Prevention Grant Program (visited Aug. 8, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/ejp2/intro-
ix.htm>.
187. See Johnson II, supra note 183, at 170 & n.95.
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 13105 (1994).
189. See id. § 13104.
190. However, the Pollution Prevention Act includes a mandatory reporting requirement.
See iad § 13106. Owners or operators of businesses that must file a toxic chemical release form
under the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) must include, on
that form, information about their source reduction and recycling activities. See id
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prevention, including its 33/50,191 Waste Wise, 92 and Design forthe Environ-
ment 93 initiatives.
194
In addition, EPA uses its negotiating leverage in enforcement actions to
encourage businesses to adopt pollution prevention practices.195 Inappropriate
circumstances, EPA will agree to reduce the financial penalty that it is seeking
from a polluter to settle an enforcement action if the polluter agrees to imple-
ment a "supplemental environmental project" (SEP).196 SEPs may include
pollution prevention projects, pollution reduction projects, environmental
191. The goal of the 33/50 initiative was to reduce emissions of 17 toxic chemicals by 33%
by 1992 and 50% by 1995, preferably through source reduction, but possibly through recycling,
reuse, and other pollution control measures. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICME Toxic
SUBSTANCEs: EPA NEEDS MoRE RELIABLE SOURCE REDUCTION DATA AND PROGRESS MEA-
SURES, ch. 0:2 (GAO/RCED-94-93) (Sept 23,1994) [hereinafter SOURCEREDUCTIONREPORT].
More than 1200 companies participated in the initiative, see id. ch.0:4.2, and emissions of the
17 chemicals were reduced by 50% a year ahead of schedule. See id. ch. 3:2.1. While EPA
touted the program as a success, many critics argued that (a) substantial emissions reductions
were achieved through pollution control measures or recycling, rather than source reduction;
(b) many of the emissions reductions were planned by companies prior to the initiative; and
(c) substantial emissions reductions that were attributed to the program were achieved by
companies that did not participate in the program. See SOURCEREDuCTION REPORT, supra, ch.
3; Joel S. Hirschhorn, Pollution Prevention Comes ofAge, 29 GA. L. REV. 325,332-33 (1995);
Voluntary Pollution Prevention Program Labeled "Sham" by Environmental Group, 25 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 280, 280-81 (June 10, 1994).
192. Waste Wise is a voluntary initiative to reduce solid waste through prevention, reuse,
and recycling. See Environmental Protection Agency, Waste Wise (visited Aug. 8, 1998)
<http:llwww.epa.gov/epaoswer/non-hw/reducewstewise/index.htm>.
193. The Design forthe Environment initiative "helps businesses incorporate environmen-
tal considerations into the design and redesign of products, processes, and technical and
management systems." See Environmental Protection Agency, Design for the Environment
(visited Aug. 8, 1998) <http:llwww.epa.gov/dfe>.
194. EPA's "Partners for the Environment" web page lists 21 national voluntary partner-
ship programs. See Environmental Protection Agency, Partners for the Environment (visited
Aug. 8, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/partnerslbrochure.htm>. This web page also includes links
to EPA's 10 regional offices, each of which have organized "voluntary programs aimed at
addressing specific regional environmental priorities." Id.
195. In EPA's 1991 Pollution Prevention Strategy, the agency announced that it antici-
pated including conditions in administrative and civil settlements of enforcement actions that
require firms to adopt pollution prevention practices either as a means of correcting violations
of environmental protection laws or in exchange for reduced fines and penalties for violations
of those laws. See Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7849, 7859 (1991).
196. See Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects
Policy (visited Aug. 8, 1998) <http:lles.epa.gov/oecalsep/sepfinal.html> [hereinafter SEP
Policy]. An SEP is an "environmentally beneficial project[ ] which a defendant/respondent
agrees to undertake in settlement of an enforcement action, but which the defendant/respondent
is not otherwise legally required to perform." Id. § B. EPA's policy "applies to all civil judicial
and administrative enforcement actions taken under the authority of the environmental statute
and regulations that the EPA administers." Id. § A.4.
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assessments and audits, and similar enterprises." Instead ofpaying money into
the Federal Treasury, the polluter may invest money in a project that will
improve the performance of its business and reduce the likelihood that the
polluter will violate environmental laws in the future. 98 EPA benefits because
the project improves the quality of the environment and/or public health, and
EPA would not have been able to require the polluter to undertake the project
if the polluter did not agree to implement the project in order to settle the en-
forcement action.'" EPA's SEP policy explicitly encourages the agencyto use
SEPs as tools for reducing environmental injustice." Despite the efforts of
Congress andEPA, many businesses have notyet adopted pollution prevention
practices."' Some mandatorymeasures, such as pollution prevention planning
requirements, may be necessary to spur additional pollution prevention.0 2
197. See id. §D. All projects musthave an adequate "nexus" totheviolation. See id.§C2.
Nexus is the relationship between the violation and the proposed project. This
relationship exists only if: a. the project is designed to reduce the likelihood that
similar violations will occur in the future; or b. the project reduces the adverse
impact to public health or the environment to which the violation at issue contrib-
utes; or c. the project reduces the overall risk to public health or the environment
potentially affected by the violation at issue. Nexus is easier to establish if the
primary impact of the project is at the site where the alleged violation occurred or
at a different site in the same ecosystem or within the immediate geographic area.
Such SEPs may have sufficient nexus even if the SEP addresses a different pollut-
ant in a different medium.
Id
198. See Elaine G. Levine, SupplementalEnvironmentalProjects: A Win/Win/Winfor the
Company, the Agency and the Environment, Presented at the American Bar Association's
Section on Natural Resources, Energy and Environmental Law Briefing on Environmental
Issues in U.S. EPA Region IV 2-3 (June 7-8, 1994).
199. See id
200. "Environmental justice" is one of six factors that the agency considers when deciding
how much a penalty should be reduced in exchange for an SEP, See SEP Policy, supra note
196, § E. In addition,
[e]mphasizing SEPs in communities where environmental justice concerns are
present helps ensure that persons who spend significant portions of their time in
areas, or depend on food and water sources located near, where the violations occur
would be protected.... EPA encourages SEPs in communities where environmen-
tal justice may be an issue.
Id § A.2.
201. See Johnson II, supra note 183, at 155 n.9; Strasser, supra note 184, at 13. While
toxic emissions, as measured by the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), are declining, the quantity
of toxic chemicals in waste is increasing. See Environmental Protection Agency, 1995 Toxics
Release Inventory Public Data Release ch. 4 (visited Aug. 8, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/
opptintr/tri/pdr95/droverO1.htm> [hereinafter 1995 TRI Data Release]. When EPA released
TRI emissions data in 1997, the agency noted that facilities submitting data did "not anticipate
discernible progress in moving" toward pollution prevention in the next two years. Id.
202. See Johnson II, supra note 183, at 189-94 (describing state pollution prevention
planning requirements).
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Traditionally, environmental laws and programs focused on controlling
and managing pollution in the air, water, and land separately. 3 This single-
media approach encourages businesses and regulators to focus on "end of
pipe" pollution controls2°' and inadvertently causes pollution to be transferred
from one medium to another.2 5 Multimedia initiatives provide similar eco-
nomic and environmental benefits as pollution prevention initiatives. Re-
cently, governments have begun to experiment with multimedia initiatives to
address simultaneously air, water, and land discharges ofa particular pollutant
or polluter. When the agency simultaneously examines the air, water, and
land discharges of a pollutant or polluter, the agency can create a more effi-
cient, less expensive2 regulatory regime for businesses by eliminating
duplicative, conflicting, and inefficient requirements that often arise in single-
media permitting and regulation.207 More importantly, when the agency
simultaneously examines all of the impacts of a polluter or pollutant, the
agency can identify cumulative or synergistic impacts more readily, and the
agency can take steps to ensure that pollution is prevented or reduced, rather
than redistributed to low-income communities.
EPA and several states have implemented several noteworthy multimedia
initiatives. First, EPA recently issued multimedia regulations that limit air
and water emissions from pulp and paper companies.20 8 The regulations are
the agency's first multimedia regulations and encourage companies to substi-
tute chlorine dioxide for chlorine to reduce dioxin and furan emissions from
203. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: AN INTE-
GRATED APPROACH COULD REDUCE POLLUTION AND INCREASE REGULATORY EFFICIENCY,
LETrER REPORT, LETrER: 2 (GAO/RCED-96-41) (Jan. 31, 1996) [hereinafter GAO LETTER
REPORT]. Because most environmental laws focus on single media, EPA and most state
environmental agencies have been organized around separate media-specific offices (for
example, water pollution office, air pollution office). See id. Program offices may have little
contact with each other. See id
204. See id.
205. See id. For instance, when a sewage treatment plant removes heavy metals and other
contaminants from its wastewater discharges, the pollutants are concentrated in sludge, which
is often disposed of on land instead of in the water. Similarly, when a power plant installs filters
to remove pollutants from its air emissions, the filtered pollutants are often disposed of on the
land instead of in the air. See GAO REINVENTION REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 1:1. The single-
media environmental statutes are not coordinated or integrated, and often contain differing
philosophies or approaches. Id.
206. See GAOLETTERREPORT, supra note 203, at:3.7; GAO REINVENTIONREPORT, supra
note 2, ch. 1.1.
207. See GAO LETTER REPORT, supra note 203, at :3.7.
208. See National Emissions Standards for Hazardous AirPollutants for Source Category:
Pulp and Paper Production; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New
Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,504
(1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 63, 261, 430).
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paper manufacturing.2"9 EPA also has reorganized many of its offices to facil-
itate multimedia initiatives.2 0
Among the states, Massachusetts has adopted a program to conduct
multimedia inspections of polluters and to bring multimedia enforcement
actions whenever possible. 2 ' New Jersey is experimenting with multimedia
permits that replace a multitude of single-media permits.21 New York assigns
employees of the state environmental agency to coordinate multimedia plan-
ning at individual industrial plants.2 3 EPA provides funding for many of
these experiments and encourages states to continue those initiatives.2 4
Although EPA and states are experimenting with multimedia approaches,
there are many barriers to a broader adoption of those approaches. Environ-
mental laws and the organizational structure of environmental agencies make
it difficult to establish multimedia permitting, regulatory, or enforcement
programs.2 5 In addition, multimedia programs are complex, costly, and time-
consuming for governments.2 6 Although multimedia initiatives provide clear
benefits for low-income communities and for the public at large, legislative




210. See GAO REINVENTIONREPORT, supra note 2, ch. 0:4.1.
211. See GAO LETER REPORT, supra note 203, at:1, :3. The state environmental agency
reorganized its compliance and enforcement office to facilitate the multimedia approach and
implemented the program statewide in 1993. See id. at :3.1. Facility-wide inspections are
unworkable atthe state's largest, most complex facilities, where the agency continues to conduct
single-media inspections. See id. at :3:2.
212. See id. at :1. The agency recently issued a single five-year permit to replace 70
separate air, water, and waste permits or approvals for an industrial facility. See id at :3.7. The
state instituted the multimedia permit program, which is a pilot program, in 199 1. See id. at :2.
It took three years for the agency to issue the first permit, and the agency only issued three
permits in the first four years of the program. See id. at :3.5.
213. See id. at :1, :2, :3.3.
214. See id. at :1. However, most of EPA's funding for state environmental programs
traditionally has been medium-specific, which discourages multimedia initiatives. See id at :2.
EPA has provided some initial funding for multimedia initiatives through single-media pro-
grams in the past and has recently launched a "performance partnership" grant program that
should provide easier access to funds for multimedia programs. See id at :4.1, :4.3; see also
Environmental Protection Agency, Performance Partnership Grants (visited Aug. 8, 1998)
<http:llaspe.os.dhhs.gov/cfda/p66605.htm>.
215. Because the environmental laws are not integrated or coordinated, they may impose
conflicting requirements that cannot be satisfied in a unified rulemaking or permitting process.
See supra note 205. Accordingly, Congressional legislators have introduced bills that would
explicitly authorize EPA to issue "integrated permits" or to issue multimedia regulations. See
S. 1348, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 3180, 105th Cong. (1997).
216. See supra note 212.
217. Policymakers often have considered the merits of harmonizing all environmental
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IV Addressing Environmental Justice in Market-Based Reforms
Pollution prevention and multimedia reforms advance environmental
justice because they focus on reducing pollution, but many market-based
reforms merely attempt to redistribute pollution in a more "cost-effective"
manner. However, as Part I of this Article notes, although the market-based
reforms generally provide cost savings to polluters over command and control
approaches, many of the reforms do not allocate resources "efficiently"
because low-income communities often (a) lack information about the deci-
sions that are being made thatwill adversely affectthe health and environment
of their community; (b) lack the financial resources to participate in that
decisionmaking process; and (c) lack notice of, and the opportunity to partici-
pate equally in, that decisionmaking process. In short, market failures prevent
the efficient allocation of environmental and public health amenities ("re-
sources").
Because Congress and EPA will continue to implement market-based
environmental reforms, this Part examines some of the ways that laws could
be reformed to empower low-income communities to participate more fully
in the markets for environmental or public health benefits. When those
reforms correct the existing market failures, perhaps the market will allocate
resources more efficiently.
A. Information and the Market
Theoretically, markets operate "efficiently" if consumers have perfect
information.2"8 In practice, consumers almost never have perfect informa-
tion.219 As a result, in the environmental arena, a community may be unaware
that a particular action could adversely affect the health or the environment
of the community, and the community may, therefore, fail to bargain with the
actors to prevent the action. If the community had more information, it might
bargain with the actor to prevent the harm. In such a situation, the market
allocates resources inefficiently because consumers have imperfect informa-
tion.
One obvious way to address this market failure and to foster environmen-
tal justice is to improve consumers' access to information. Market-based
requirements in a single, unified environmental law. See, e.g., Recommendations on Unified
Environmental Law Expected Before End of 1996, EPA Official Says, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA)
1125, 1125-26 (Oct. 27, 1995); Unfied Statute Would Help States Move Forward with Multi-
media Permits, Other Plans, NEPISays, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1469, 1469 (Nov. 15, 1996).
218. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings Under Cali-
fornia's Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGYL.Q. 303,313 (1996) (discussing information disclosure
laws).
219. See id. at 315-18 (discussing limits of information disclosure laws).
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reforms could include provisions that require participants or the government
to provide detailed information to communities about the potential environ-
mental and public health impacts ofpollution trades, waivers, or modifications
of regulatory requirements or similar market-based initiatives. Existing
"information disclosure" laws should also be expanded and improved. Those
information disclosure requirements would reduce, but not eliminate, the
likelihood that the market would allocate resources inefficiently.' ° Informa-
tion disclosure provisions would also promote individual autonomy and
advance democratic decisionmaking. 22'
Over the past decade, Congress, EPA, and the states have increasingly
relied on information disclosure laws to produce environmental benefits in
economically efficient ways. The Emergency Planning and Community Right
to Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA)m is the most notable of those efforts' and
is a model for laws in other nations. ' 4 EPCRA requires thousands of manu-
facturing facilities to provide EPA and states with information about the
quantity of regulated chemicals that they used or released into the air, water,
or land in a previous year.' That information is made available to the public
as a "Toxic Release Inventory" (TRI). EPA calls the TRI one of its most
effective and powerful tools for improving environmental performance. " 6
Facilities that report their pollution releases for the TRI reduced their releases
by 44% in the first 8 years of reporting. 7 Theoretically, citizens armed with
TRI data can negotiate with polluters to encourage them to reduce their
releases, lobby legislators or agencies to limit pollution, boycott polluters, or
even use the information as a basis for citizen suits when the information
discloses violations of other environmental laws." The release of the infor-
220. Obviously, the community may still lack the financial resources or power to bargain
to prevent harm. See id. at 317 & n.68. However, even communities that lack sufficient
resources to prevent harm can participate in the market to increase the cost of pollution to
polluters by holding demonstrations and by creating bad publicity for polluters.
221. See id. at314-15.
222. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994).
223. See generallyGaryD. Bass& AlairMacLean, EnhancingthePublic'sRight-to-Know
About Environmental Issues, 4 VILL. ENvrL. L.J. 287 (1993).
224. "PollutantRelease and TransferRegisters" havebeen implemented in Canada, France,
Norway, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom and are being established in at least nine
other countries. See 1995 TRIData Release, supra note 201, ch. 3.
225. See 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1994).
226. See Addition of'ReportingElements; Toxic Chemical ReleaseReporting; Community
Right-to-Know, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,322, 51,322 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372)
(proposed Oct. 1, 1996).
227. See id.
228. See ELI Report, supra note 1, § 9.1; 1995 TRIData Release, supra note 201, ch. 2;
Bass & MacLean, supra note 223, at 297-98. As a practical matter, though, low-income
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mation also fosters environmentaljustice because it enables governments and
citizens to identify and to act to prevent hot spots of pollution.
Other federal initiatives also have included information disclosure
requirements. Recent revisions to the Safe Drinking Water Act require
drinking water suppliers to provide consumers with reports about the source
oftheir drinking water, about the health and environmental effects ofcontami-
nants in their drinking water, and about the compliance history of the drinking
water supplier. 9 EPA recently launched a "consumer labeling initiative"
to improve the quality of health and environmental information on insecti-
cide, pesticide, and household cleaner labels,' 0 and the Federal Trade Com-
mission has issued "green marketing guidelines" to prevent businesses from
making false or misleading advertising claims about the environmental bene-
fits of products." All of these initiatives provide consumers with more
complete information so that they can make informed choices about purchas-
ing products or using resources in ways that protect their health and environ-
ment.
Information disclosure requirements are central to many recent state laws
as well. For instance, California's Proposition 65 requires businesses to pro-
vide notices to the public about exposures to toxic chemicals 2 in consumer
communities often lack the political or economic power to use the TRI information in these
ways.
229. See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c) (Supp. 1997). The amendments require suppliers to notify
consumers within 24 hours of any violations that present a threat to public health. See id
§ 300g-3(c)(2)(C).. The amendments also require all suppliers who serve more than 10,000
people to send consumers an annual "consumer confidence report" that describes the source and
quality ofthe drinking water. See id § 300g-3(c)(4). Smaller suppliers must prepare the reports
as well, but they may only be required to publish the report in a newspaper or to make it
available upon request to consumers. See id The law requires EPA to establish a national
database to track the occurrence of contaminants in drinking water, and EPA plans to make the
database available electronically by 1999. See id § 300j-4(g). EPA issued proposed regula-
tions in February 1998 to implement the information disclosure requirements of the amend-
ments. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Consumer Confidence Reports, 63 Fed.
Reg. 7605-33 (1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141-42) (proposed Feb. 13, 1998). The
regulations would apply to 56,000 water systems that serve more than 240 million people. See
Design Phase ofNational Database Under Development at EPA, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2166,
2166 (Feb. 20, 1998). The regulations were finalized in August 1998. See National Primary
Drinking Water Regulations: Consumer Confidence Reports, 63 Fed. Reg. 44,511, 44,511-36
(1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141-42).
230. See Notice of Project Initiation, 61 Fed. Reg. 12,011 (1996); see also Environmental
Protection Agency, For YourInformation: ConsumerLabelinglnitiative (visited Aug. 8,1998)
<http://www.epa.gov/oppfeadl/Cb/Csbpagelqsas/clifyi.htm>.
231. See 16 C.F.R. pt. 260 (1998); see also ELI Report, supra note 1, § 9.7.1.
232. The law applies to carcinogens or reproductive toxicants that are included on a list
that the state prepares. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 1992 & Supp.
1997).
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products, at work, and in the environment. 3 The law aims to provide infor-
mation to the public that will enable citizens to reduce their exposure to toxic
chemicals 4 and will encourage businesses to reduce their use or release of
toxics. 5 Proposition 65 has successfully encouraged many companies to
reformulate consumer products to reduce the use oftoxics in their products' 6
and has played some role in encouraging businesses to reduce releases of
toxics at work and in the environment.~"
There are some limits to the effectiveness of information disclosure laws,
though. The information that the laws provide to consumers may be incom-
plete,28 inaccuratem 9 or confusing240 at times. In addition, the public may not
233. See idJ §§ 25249.5-. 13. The law identifies optimal warnings that businesses can use,
but are not required to use, to satisfy the notice requirements of the law. See CAL. CODE REGs.
tit. 26 § 22-12601(a) (1996).
234. The law can be enforced by pub lic prosecutors or by "any person in the public
interest." See CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 25249.7(d).
235. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 218, at 307.
236. See id. at 341. Numerous manufacturers of glazed ceramic-ware have agreed to
reduce lead levels in their flatware by 50%, and approximately 300 wineries have agreed to
phase out the use of lead foil caps on their wine bottles. See id. at 341-42. Several cosmetic
manufacturers have agreed to remove toluene from a variety of different types of nail polish.
See id. at 342. Although the product modifications seem to be motivated by concerns about
liability rather than by consumer pressure, they are caused to some extent by manufacturers'
concerns that "green consumers" will not buy products that contain warnings that suggest that
the products contain toxic chemicals. See id. at 343-46.
237. See id. at 307, 348-50.
238. For instance, EPCRA does not require federal manufacturing facilities to report
information about pollution emissions. See Bass & MacLean, supra note 223, at 301. More-
over, EPCRA exempts from its requirements large chemical users such as utilities and mines.
See id Although the White House extended the reporting requirement to federal facilities, see
Exec. Order No. 12,856, 58 Fed. Reg. 41,981 (1993), and EPA issued rules to extend the
reporting requirements to seven other industries, see Addition of Facilities in Certain Industry
Sectors; Revised Interpretation of Otherwise Use; Toxic Release Inventory Reporting; Commu-
nity Right-to-Know, 62 Fed. Reg. 23,833, 23,834 (1997) (to be codified at40 C.F.RI pt. 372),
many polluters do not have to file reports under EPCRA. In addition, although polluters must
file reports regarding emissions of approximately 600 chemicals, see Addition of Certain
Chemicals; Toxic Chemical Release Reporting; Community Right-to-Know, 59 Fed. Reg.
61,432, 61,432 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372), many dangerous chemicals are not
covered by EPCRA. Furthermore, although businesses must report total annual emissions of
regulated pollutants, businesses do not have to report the pattern ofreleases under EPCRA. See
Bass & MacLean, supra note 223, at 301-02. "For example, if a company released 10,000
pounds ofbenzene to the air, there is no way to know if small amounts were released throughout
the year, or whether 8000 pounds of benzene were released in one week." Id. at 302.
Similar problems plague California's Proposition 65. The consumer product, workplace,
and environmental warnings that businesses have provided under the law have been very vague
and general and have usually failed to inform citizens about the nature of the risk that the
businesses' practices pose to health orto the environment. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 218,
at 307,326-27,333-37. For instance, the generic warning that is placed on consumer products
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be aware that the information exists,4 ' or the public may be unable to access
or to understand the information.242 In those situations, it is less likely that the
information disclosure laws will achieve their goal of empowering citizens to
use the market to protect health and the environment. 43
Accordingly, legislators and regulators should take several steps to
incorporate information disclosure requirements into market-based reforms
and to expand and to improve the information disclosure requirements in
existing laws (like EPCRA) to provide more complete and more accurate
information.2" Data that agencies collect under any of the environmental
merely says that the product contains a chemical (without specifying which) known to the state
to cause cancer, birth defects, or other reproductive harm. See id. at 325. Accordingly, the
warnings fail to promote informed choice and enhanced decisionmaking by citizens. See id. at
307, 340.
239. For instance, under EPCRA, manufacturers report their pollution emissions based on
their own estimates, and manufacturers may change their methods of estimating emissions from
year to year. See Bass & MacLean, supra note 223, at 301. As a result, EPA estimated that
a significant portion of the reduction in emissions over the first few years of the Toxic Release
Inventory was due, in part, to changes in the way releases were estimated, rather than to envir-
onmental improvements. See SOURCE REDUCTION REPORT, supra note 191, ch. 3. In addition,
information must be released in a timely fashion in order to remain useful. See Bass & Mac-
Lean, supra note 223, at 288.
240. The Toxic Release Inventory, for example, only includes information about the
amount and location of pollution releases and does not include information about the health or
environmental risks caused by regulated pollutants. See ELIReport, supra note 1, § 9.2; 1995
TRIData Release, supra note 201, ch. 2. Industries have complained that the public misinter-
prets the data that is released under EPCRA because the data is not explained in more detail or
in context. See Bass & MacLean, supra note 223, at 302; Panel Drafts Recommendations to
Help EPA Improve Public Understanding of TRIData, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2031, 2031 (Feb.
6, 1998).
241. A few years after the Toxic Release Inventory was created, the General Accounting
Office conducted a telephone survey of residents in three counties with high levels of toxic
emissions and concluded that nearly 60% of the residents in those counties did not know that
the Toxic Release Inventory data was publicly available. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
ToxIc CHEMICALS: EPA's ToXIc RELEASE INvENTORY Is USEFUL BUT CAN BE IMPROVED 33
(GAO/RCED-91-121) (June 1991).
242. In order to enable citizens to use information efficiently, the information must be
provided to citizens in a user-friendly format. See Bass & MacLean, supra note 223, at 288.
If there is too much information available to citizens, it may be difficult to access useful
information. See it at 295. "Presenting information in a manner that facilitates understanding
and analysis by the public is essential to democratic right-to-know principles." Id. at 289.
243. Nevertheless, only a small group of information-seeking consumers actually needs to
use the information to achieve the health and environmental goals of the laws. See
Rechtschaffen, supra note 218, at 318. A small group of citizens that discovers and uses the
information can encourage businesses to change their practices to reduce pollution in ways that
benefit large numbers of citizens who were oblivious to the information. See id.
244. EPA is currently considering using its authority under the Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994), the Pollution Prevention
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laws should be cross-linked and integrated so that the information will be
more meaningful and accessible to the public.24 In order to increase access
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-13109(1994), the Toxic Substances Control Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
2692 (1994), or other environmental laws to require businesses that file aTRI reportto include,
in the report, information about the way that the business uses chemicals at their facility. See
Advance Notice, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,322 (1997) (advanced notice of proposed rulemaking issued
Oct. 1, 1996). In the advanced notice of proposed rulemaking for this "TRI Phase III expan-
sion," EPA indicated that it might require businesses to report "mass balance" (chemical
throughput) information. Id. at 51,324; see Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 63 Fed. Reg.
22,601,22,704 (1998) (sameproposal included inEPA's semiannual regulatory agendaofApril
27, 1998). Federal legislators have introduced bills that would require businesses to report
some of this information as part of their TRI report. See H.R. 1636, 105th Cong. (1997); S.
769, 105th Cong. (1997).
EPA argues that TRI expansion will increase businesses' ability to use toxics efficiently,
increase businesses' ability to reduce toxics use, and will provide more complete and useful
information to citizens, which will "better position... the public... to participate on an equal
footing in environmental decisionmaking." See 61 Fed. Reg. at 51,323. However, the agency
stresses that the purpose of the expansion is not to promote toxics use reduction as a federal
policy. See Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, Environmental Protection Agency, Issue
Paper # 3: TRI-Phase 3: Expansion of the EPA Community Right-to-Know Program (visited
Aug. 8, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/tri/trip3v6.htm>.
New Jersey and Massachusetts already require businesses to provide chemical use data
under state toxics use reduction laws. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 51,324. Since the Massachusetts
Toxics Use Reduction Act took effect in 1990, the use of toxic chemicals in the state has fallen
by 17% and the volume of toxic chemicals in waste has fallen by 25%. See Massachusetts
Chemical Use Law Lauded; Industry Groups Oppose Proposed EPA Program, 27 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1346, 1346-47 (Oct. 18, 1996).
Businesses have generally opposed EPA's efforts to expand the TRI to include "chemical
use" information because businesses are concerned (a) that much of the information that EPA
seeks to make public is confidential business information and publicizing the information would
encourage industrial espionage and theft of confidential information, see 61 Fed. Reg. at
51,324; (b) that the reporting requirements would be extraordinarily expensive and time-
consuming, see Industry Opposes Adding Use Data to Expanded Toxic Release Inventory, 25
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1158, 1158 (Oct. 7, 1994); and (c) that the reporting requirement is based
on a false premise that any type of chemical use is harmful and should be eliminated. See 61
Fed. Reg. at 51,326.
245. See OFFICEOF REINVENTION, ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTIONAGENCY, THECHANGING
NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION: AN ANNUAL REPORT ON
REINVENTION 22-23 (EPAI00-R-98-003) (Mar. 1998) (visited Aug. 8, 1998) <http:l/www.epa.
gov/reinventlannual97/report97.pdf> [hereinafter EPA REINVENTION REPORT]. EPA has
launched many initiatives that integrate the data collected by the agency. For instance, EPA has
created an "Envirofacts" database that is accessible over the Internet and includes permitting,
compliance, and enforcement data under CERCLA, RCRA, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water
Act, the TRI, and other environmental laws. See Environmental Protection Agency, Envirofacts
Warehouse: Overview (visited Aug. 8, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/enviro/html/efoverview.
html>.
EPA has also created a "Surf Your Watershed" web site that allows users to locate a
watershed on a map, to obtain information about the demographics of the population in the
watershed and the land characteristics of the watershed, and to link to EPA databases that
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to information, data collected by agencies should be made available in elec-
tronic formats whenever possible, preferably overthe Internet.246 Steps should
provide information about TRI releases, Superfund sites, Clean Water Act or Clean Air Act
permittees, hazardous waste generators ortreatment, storage or disposal facilities, and water use
in the watershed. See Environmental Protection Agency, Surf Your Watershed (visited Aug. 8,
1998) <http:llwww.epa.gov/surf/>. The web site also ranks the health of the watershed, using
an index of watershed indicators. Id.
The "Sector Facility Indexing Project" is another major EPA information integration
initiative. Theprojectintegrates permitting, compliance, enforcement, demographic, and health
and environmental quality data from several government databases to create individual profiles
for facilities in the petroleum refining, iron and steel, primary nonferrous metals, pulp mills, and
automobile assembly industrial sectors. See Environmental Protection Agency, Sector Facility
Indexing Project Home Page (visited Aug. 8, 1998) <http:lles.epa.gov/oeca/sfi>. EPA initially
planned to launch the database in January 1998, and to include "toxicity weighing factors" in
the database to identify the degree of harm that particular chemicals may cause to human health
or the environment, so that citizens could understand which chemicals are more hazardous than
others. See Proposed Database on Industrial Releases Would Exaggerate Risks, Officials Tell
EPA, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 440,440 (July 4, 1997). In order to verify the accuracy of the data,
EPA asked facilities in the five industrial sectors to review the data before the agency launched
the web site. See Environmental Protection Agency, Sector Facility Indexing Project: Com-
ment and Data Review Process (visited Aug. 8, 1998) <http://es.epa.gov/oeca/sfi/review.
htn>. However, the American Automobile Manufacturers Association asked its members to
boycott reviewing the information, 19 states urged EPA to scrap the project, see Release of
Facility-Specific Data Delayed; Internet Access Plannedfor 1998, EPA Says, 28 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1260, 1260 (Oct. 24, 1997), and opponents filed a lawsuit to delay the release of the
information. See Lawsuit Seeks Delay of EPA Database That Would Put Modified TRI Data
on Web, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2030, 2030-31 (Feb. 6, 1998) (discussing Tozzi v. EPA, No.
1:98CV00169 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 23, 1998)). Critics suggested thatthetoxicity weighing factors
could mislead the public, see Information on Local Facilities Delayed; Internet Data Ready
Soon, OfficialSays, 28 Env'tRep. (BNA) 1725, 1725 (Jan. 9, 1998), and the agency eventually
decided to remove the weighing factors from the database. See Facility-Specific Database Set
for Release, Will Put Compliance Records in One Place, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2527, 2527
(Apr. 3, 1998).' The web site was eventually launched in May 1998. See Notice of Availability,
63 Fed. Reg. 27,281, 27,281 (1998) (noting availability of data on Internet announced May 18,
1998).
EPA also unveiled a "Center for Environmental Information and Statistics" in August
1998 to provide citizens with integrated analyses of environmental data and report on environ-
mental quality, status and trends. See EPA REINVENTION REPORT, supra, at 24; see also Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, Centerfor Environmental Information and Statistics Home Page
(visited Aug. 21, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/ceis>.
Public interest organizations are also trying to integrate environmental information in
order to make it more comprehensible and accessible. See, e.g., The Environmental Defense
Fund, The Chemical Scorecard (visited Aug. 8, 1998) <http://www.scorecard.org>.
246. The Internet holds great promise as atool to increase public access to information and
public participation in government decisionmaking. See generally Stephen M. Johnson, The
Internet Changes Everything: RevolutionizingPublic Participation andAccess to Government
Information Through theInternet, 50 ADMIN.L.REV. 277,277-337 (1998) [hereinafter Johnson
III].
EPCRA was the first statute to require an agency to provide information to the public
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be taken to educate the public about the availability of information and about
the meaning of the information. Although agencies should lead this effort,247
law schools could play an important role as community educators by holding
seminars or workshops, providing "Street Law" courses in local schools,24 or
developing web pages or community handbooks that explain the informa-
tion. 49 Finally, the citizen suit and penalty provisions of information disclo-
sure laws should be strengthened to encourage businesses to provide complete
and timely information.
These changes would increase the possibility that accurate and complete
environmental and health information will be available to citizens and that
citizens will (a) know that the information is available; (b) access the informa-
tion; (c) understand the information; and (d) act on the information in a
manner that protects their health and the environment. In short, the improve-
ments should compensate for some of the market failures that occur because
communities lack information about the health and environmental impacts of
polluters' actions.
B. Grants, Loans, and Economic Assistance for Market Participation
Low-income communities may also fail to participate in the market for
health and environmental benefits because the communities do not have
sufficient financial resources to bargain for those benefits or even to partici-
pate in the decisionmaking process. In a market-based system, low-income
communities may never have sufficient resources to bargain successfully for
environmental or health benefits."0 However, technical assistance grants and
through a computerized, online database. See Bass & MacLean, supra note 223, at 288. The
Toxic Release Inventory information is now available overthelnternet, and EPA is aggressively
increasing the volume of environmental information, collected or prepared under any of the
environmental laws, that it makes available over the Internet. EPA's web pages are visited over
27 million times each month. See EPA RERNVENTION REPORT, supra note 245, at 25.
However, as agencies make more information accessible over the Internet, the agencies
must take steps to ensure that low-income communities have equal access to that inforxhation.
See Bass & MacLean, supra note 223, at 316; Johnson III, supra, at 305-10.
247. Agencies could make presentations at town meetings, sponsor information booths at
state or county fairs, or provide funding to community or environmental groups to educate the
public about the type and the meaning of information that is available.
248. Many law schools have established "Street Law" clinical programs, in which law
students or professors teach courses on law and democracy to local high school students. See
Street Law, Inc., Street Law: Who We Are (visited Aug. 8, 1998) <http://www.streetlaw.org/
who.html>.
249. See, e.g., Stephen M. Johnson, Toxics in Your Community (visited Aug. 8, 1998)
<http://168.17.208.15/elaw/toxics.html> (representing handbook on public information about
toxic substances, hazardous waste, and hazardous substances in Georgia).
250. See Kaswan, supra note 95, at 236-37, 271-72.
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loans could be made available to communities that would, at the very least,
enable communities to participate in the decisionmaking process. Without
such assistance, communities may be unable to retain experts to evaluate the
environmental and health impacts of pollution trades, to evaluate waivers or
modifications of environmental regulations for Project XL projects or brown-
fields redevelopment, or to evaluate other market-based actions. 1 Conse-
quently, communities would be unable to determine the impacts of the pro-
posed action and would be seriously disadvantaged in the environmental
bargaining (decisionmaking) process.
While there are some grants available to communities to assist in review-
ing Project XL pilot programs and brownfields redevelopment proposals, 2
public interest advocates argue that the funding is inadequate, that the process
for obtaining the funds is difficult, and that there are unnecessary limits on the
use of funds. 3 In addition, there are no programs that provide funds to com-
munities to evaluate the impacts of pollutant trades on the community.
Legislators and regulators could take several steps to facilitate the partic-
ipation of low-income communities in the market-based decisionmaking
process. First, technical assistance grants to review trades, waivers, and other
market-based actions could be expanded and simplified and targeted at low-
income communities or communities that have been disparately impacted by
pollution. Technical assistance grants for traditional command and control
programs should also be expanded and simplified to enable low-income
communities to participate in those decisionmaking processes."' After all,
251. See id at 273 (noting that low-income communities already lack resources to hire
experts to evaluate impacts of decisions made under traditional command and control laws).
252. For instance, EPA's Guidelines for Brownfields Assessment Demonstration Grant
proposals state that
[b]rownfields pilot funds may by used for outreach activities that educate the public
about assessment, identification, characterization, or remedial planning activities
at a site or set of sites. However, the outreach should be directed toward obtaining
more effective public involvement and/or environmental assessment and cleanup
of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants at affected sites. These funds
may not be used for general education activities (e.g., grants to schools for develop-
ment of curriculum).
Environmental Protection Agency, The Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative:
Proposal Guidelinesfor BrownfieldsAssessmentDemonstration Pilots 5 (EPA 500-F-97-156)
(Oct. 1997) <http:llwww.epa.gov/swerospslbf/html-doclappbook.htm>; see Steinzor, supra note
95, at 145-46 (discussing EPA funding for community review of Project XL pilot proposals).
253. See Steinzor, supra note 95, at 145-46.
254. While technical assistance grants are available under the Superfund law and many
state solid waste, water, and air pollution programs, critics argue that these grant programs are
complicated, underfunded, and otherwise inadequate. See John S. Applegate, Beyondthe Usual
Suspects: The Use of CitizensAdvisory Boards inEnvironmentalDecisionmaking, 73 IND.L.J.
903, 922-23 (1998).
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many of the environmental and health problems in low-income communities
are caused by the cumulative effects of actions under the traditional command
and control programs. Finally, legislators and regulators should provide more
funding to encourage pollution prevention because pollution prevention
reduces the amount of pollution in the environment and, consequently, re-
duces the amount of pollution that can be dumped in low-income or minority
communities. '
255. See supra note 186 and accompanying text EPA has already implemented several
pollution prevention grant programs, and the agency should provide more funding for those
programs, simplify the application process, and take further steps to promote the programs and
pollution prevention in general.
EPA provides pollution prevention grants in several forms. First, the agency established
a "Pollution Prevention Incentives for States" (PPIS) grant program in 1989 to provide money
to states to develop and implement pollution prevention programs. See OFFICE OF POLLUTION
PREVENTION AND Toxacs, ENViRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, POLLUrION PREVENTION
INCENTIVES FOR STATES ASSESSMENT STUDY 6 (EPA742-R96-006) (1996) [hereinafter PPIS
ASSESSMENT STUDY]. EPA awarded $49 million to grantees in the first nine years of the
program. See OFFICEOFPOLLUTIONPREVENTIONAND ToxiCS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, POLLUTIONPREVENTIONINCEMTIVFORSTATESFY 1998 GRANTGUIDANCE 1 (1998)
[hereinafterPPISGRANTGUIDANCE]. Grantees used the funds to publicize pollution prevention
opportunities and successes, to provide technical assistance to industries through pollution
prevention assessments, site visits, information clearinghouses, case studies, and other guidance
materials, and to hire and train regulatory employees to administer and promote pollution
prevention programs. See PPIS ASSESSMENT STUDY, supra, at 12-13, 18,21,23. While many
of the past grants targeted pollution prevention by industries, EPA is encouraging states to use
funds for pollution prevention programs in the agriculture, energy, and health and transportation
sectors and to promote environmental justice. Id. at 6. The goal of the program is to create seed
money for self-sustaining state programs. See id. at 7-12.
EPA also provides pollution prevention grants that directly promote environmentaljustice
through an "Environmental Justice Through Pollution Prevention" (EJP2) grant program. See
Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Justice ThroughPollutionPrevention Grant
Program (visited Aug. 8,1998) <http'//www.epa.gov/opptintr/ejp2> [hereinafterEnvironmental
Justice Through Pollution Prevention Grant Program]. Through the program, EPA provides
"financial assistance to help low income and minority communities address environmental
problems through pollution prevention instead of traditional pollution control techniques." Id.
EPA anticipated up to $4 million in EJP2 grants in 1998. See Notice of Availability, 63 Fed.
Reg. 3563, 3563 (1998) (notice of availability of grant funds issued Jan. 23, 1998). Private
businesses, federal agencies, and individuals are not eligible for the grants. I at 3564. The
grants can be used for projects such as "information access" projects that provide easier access
to environmental information or education about that information to a community, "small
business assistance" projects that implementpollution prevention, and brownfields projects that
assist communities in participating in cleanup and redevelopment decisions and encourage
pollution prevention in the project. See Environmental Justice Through Pollution Prevention
Grant Program, supra.
EPA also provides grants for pollution prevention through its Risk Reduction Through
Pollution Prevention, Agriculture in Concert with the Environment, and National Industrial
Competitiveness Through Efficiency: Energy, Environment and Economics grant programs.
See PPIS ASSESSMENT STUDY, supra, at 8.
In 1997, EPA anticipated that it would provide almost $1 million in grants through a
"Pollution Prevention Information Network" grant competition to create new centers for the
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C. Public Participation
While technical assistance grants and loans may increase the likelihood
that a community can afford to participate in environmental decisionmaking
in market-based programs, other obstacles have limited public participation
by low-income and minority communities in environmental decisionmaking
in the past. 6 Traditionally, in many command and control programs, com-
munities have not been provided with information or an opportunity to pro-
vide input in the process until the government has, for all intents and pur-
poses, selected a course of action. 7 Additionally, public meetings and
hearings have been scheduled at times, locations, and in formats that limit
opportunities for public participation."
Procedures that limit public participation increase the likelihood that
individual citizens will forego participation in government decisionmaking
because citizens may decide that they will not be able to influence the ultimate
decision or that they will not be sufficiently impacted by the government's
proposed action to justify devoting their time and energy. As a result, al-
though a community may be cumulatively severely impacted by the govern-
ment's decision to waive regulatory requirements or to allow companies to
trade pollution rights, limited participation procedures may prevent individual
citizens from actively participating in the decisionmaking process. While
limited public participation clearly harms communities, it also harms the
government, which makes decisions based on incomplete information. 9
When governments make decisions based on incomplete information, it is
more likely that their decisions will not allocate resources efficiently.
Accordingly, broad and flexible public participation procedures should
be included in all pollutant trading, regulatory waiver or variance programs,
collection, synthesis, and dissemination ofpollution prevention information and to coordinate
pollution prevention information management efforts. See Notice ofAvailability, 62 Fed. Reg.
5393, 5393 (1997) (notice of availability of 1997 grant funds issued in Feb. 5, 1997).
256. See Applegate, supra note 254, at 906-18; Stephen M. Johnson, NEPA and SEPA 's
in the Quest for Environmental Justice, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 565, 603 (1997) [hereinafter
Johnson IV].
257. See Applegate, supra note 254, at 906-08.
258. See Johnson IV, supra note 256, at 603.
259. See Johnson M, supra note 246, at 300. In a recent Federal Register announcement
regarding Project XL, EPA stressed that
[s]takeholder involvement is critical to the success of each XL project. Stake-
holders provide information about the preferences of the community. They may
identify issues that have escaped the notice of project sponsors and regulators....
An effective process for stakeholder involvement is an acknowledgment that
today's regulators and regulated community do not have a monopoly on the best
ideas for tomorrow's system of environmental protection.
Notice of Modifications, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,872, 19,877 (1997) (notice ofmodifications to Project
XL issued Apr. 23, 1997).
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and other market-based environmental protection programs that enable low-
income communities, and all citizens, to participate in the market for health
and environmental amenities. In addition, broad and flexible public participa-
tion procedures should be incorporated into traditional command and control
programs to ensure that baseline pollution levels in low-income communities
are not disproportionately high before trading or other market-based programs
are implemented.
The National Environmental Justice Advisory Council's Model Plan for
Public Participation identifies several "core values" for public participation
programs2" and establishes a model public participation strategy, which
includes, among other recommendations, identifying key individuals who can
represent various stakeholder interests, soliciting stakeholder involvement
early in the policy-making process, developing relationships with community
organizations and providing resources for their needs, regionalizing materials
to ensure cultural sensitivity and relevance, establishing site-specific commu-
nity advisory boards where there is sufficient and sustained interest, and
scheduling meetings and/or hearings to make them accessible and user
friendly for stakeholders.26'
Environmental justice advocates have frequently emphasized the central
role of public participation in achieving environmental justice in traditional
command and control programs.262 In market-based programs, it is even more
important to provide opportunities for public participation because market-
based programs reduce the role of the government as a decisionmaker and,
consequently, reduce the protections afforded to minority interests.2 63
The federal government and state governments are already making
efforts to improve public participation procedures under traditional environ-
mental laws. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and many, other laws already
allow, but do not require, agencies to provide broader, more flexible public
260. See National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, The Model Plan for Public
Participation 5 (visited Aug. 8, 1998) <http:llwww.prcemi.comlnejaclpdf/modelbk.pdf>
[hereinafter NEJUAC Public Participation Plan].
261. Id. at 6-9. For an interesting article regarding the use and evolution of citizen ad-
visory boards, see generally Applegate, supra note 254.
262. See NEJAC Public Participation Plan, supra note 260, at i; Johnson IV, supra note
256, at 572; Kaswan, supra note 95, at 251; Michael B. Gerard, Demons and Angels in
Hazardous Waste Regulation: Are Justice, Efficiency andDemocracy Reconcilable?, 92 Nw.
U. L. RFv. 706, 735-36 (1998) (book review).
263. Theoretically, in command and control programs, the government protects the
interests of minority voices and makes environmental decisions in the public interest. See
Applegate, supra note 254, at 903-04. Pollutant trading programs and many other market-based
programs provide individuals with the decisionmaking authority and limit the government's
power to intervene to protect minority interests that are not protected by the market.
ECONOMICS V. EQUITY
participation procedures, and President Clinton's environmentaljustice exec-
utive order encourages federal agencies to take advantage of those author-
ities.2"
EPA also is including broad public participation provisions in some of
its recent market-based programs, such as Project XL.265 While public partici-
pation requirements could increase the administrative hurdles for market-
based programs and, thereby, reduce the incentive to participate in those
programs, broad and flexible participation procedures are vital to ensure that
affected communities will have the opportunity to participate in the decision-
making process and that decisionmakers will have complete information for
their decisions.
264. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859, §§ 1-103(a), 5-5 (1995) (requiring that
agencies provide mechanisms necessary for minority or low-income groups to participate effec-
tively in government decisions).
EPA's Environmental Appeals Board has noted that the agency has "significant dis-
cretion.., to implement the mandates" of the executive order to ensure that there is adequate
public participation in RCRA permitting, and the Board encouraged the agency to offer "early
and ongoing" opportunities for public participation beyond those required by regulation when
the agency "has a basis to believe that the [permitting decision] ... may have a disproportionate
impact on a minority or low-income segment of the affected community." See In re Chemical
Waste Mgt of Ind., Inc., INO 078911046, 1995 EPA App. LEXIS 25, at * 17 (June 25, 1995).
EPA recently amended its hazardous waste permitting regulations to provide for increased
public participation, and the agency plans to issue guidance on ways to advance "equitable
public participation." See RCRA Expanded Public Participation, 60 Fed. Reg. 63,417, 63,420
(1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 124, 270).
Similarly, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) recently drafted guidance
regarding the executive order that encourages federal agencies to develop innovative methods
to involve low-income and minority communities in review of documents prepared under the
National Environmental Policy Act. See Johnson IV, supra note 256, at 575.
265. Recent Project XL guidance indicates that "the extent to which project proponents
have sought and achieved the support of parties that have a stake in the environmental impacts
of the project" is "an important factor" in EPA's approval of projects. See Notice of Modifica-
tions, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,872, 19,877 (notice issued Apr. 23, 1997). The agency's guidance
establishes aprocedure that project sponsors should follow to negotiate with the community and
other stakeholders to develop a project before formally applying to the agency for approval of
the project. Id at 19,878-79. Most of the important documents in the development of a Project
XL project are posted on the Internet to increase public access to the information. Id at 19,880.
While the Project XL negotiation process is initiated by the project developers, rather than the
agency, and the developer can apply to the agency for approval of the project even though the
negotiation participants have not reached consensus on the project, EPA has indicated that
projects that receive significant dissent from public interest participants will be more likely to
be disapproved. Id Cynics may argue that the government is more willing to require broad
public participation procedures for Project XL than for traditional command and control
programs because the agency may lack the statutory authority to approve certain Project XL
projects and that broad public participation may reduce the likelihood that opponents will
challenge the projects in court.
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D. Command and Control Safety Net
As noted above, market-based environmental reforms and traditional
environmental laws could be modified to address some of the market failures
that prevent "efficient" distribution of environmental and public health re-
sources in a free market. However, while the modifications might enable low-
income communities to play amore active role in market-based environmental
decisionmaking, existing disparities in the distribution of wealth in society
may ultimately prevent low-income communities from avoiding disproportion-
ate exposure to pollution. Consequently, command and control "safety nets"
may be necessary to protect low-income communities in a market-based
environmental protection system.
While the inequitable distribution of pollution in low-income communi-
ties has been blamed on many factors, commentators agree that one of the
major contributing factors is the failure of the environmental laws to require
government regulators to consider the distributional impacts of their regula-
tory, permitting, or enforcement decisions."' Accordingly, in order to ensure
that market-based reforms do not exacerbate environmental injustice, those
reforms could be modified to prohibit trades, waivers of environmental laws
or regulations, or other actions that disparately impact low-income communi-
ties. At a minimum, regulators could be required to examine the impacts of
those actions on low-income communities. More broadly, perhaps market-
based and command and control environmental laws could be modified to
require governments to consider the distributional impacts of their decision-
making. The laws could even prohibit actions under those laws that have
disparate impacts on low-income communities.
However, both approaches might be difficult to implement, politically
and administratively. The narrow approach increases the government's role
in reviewing and overseeing private actions in a market-based system and
seems antithetical to the rationale for the reforms. To the extent that the
government prohibits certain trades or regulatory waivers that disparately
impact low-income communities or reviews the distributional impacts of
trades, waivers, and other actions in a market-based system, businesses and
the regulated community may be less likely to take advantage of those tools,
which are often quite time-consuming.
In addition, in order to determine whether trades, waivers, and other
actions in market-based programs disparately impact low-income communi-
ties, government regulators must collect and examine large amounts of data
266. See Kaswan, supra note 95, at223, 260,268-69,273; Lazarus, supra note 40, at 816-
18, 842-44. To the extent that environmental laws address distributional issues, the laws
include exemptions and waivers to reduce economic burdens on specific businesses or indus-
tries, rather than to protect public health or the environment. See id. at 814.
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regarding the cumulative and synergistic impacts of pollution on the commu-
nity and the demographics of the community.267 Like previous efforts to "fine-
tune" environmental regulation, this information collection effort will be time-
consuming and expensive for regulators." s Data gaps will. be inevitable, and
decisions that agencies make in light of those data gaps will be prone to legal
challenge. 9 Important legal terms, such as "low-income community" or
"inequitable distribution" will have to be defined. These implementation
problems have stalled previous efforts to "fine-tune" environmental regulation
to focus more specifically on site-specific environmental impacts and case-by-
case decisionmaking.27
The broader "safety net" approach shares all of the problems presented
by the narrow approach because the broader approach encompasses the
narrow approach. Under the broad approach, Congress would amend the
existing environmental laws andmarket-based reforms to prohibit actions that
disparately impact low-income communities or to require regulators to con-
sider the distributional impacts oftheir actions under those laws. It is unlikely
that Congress will adopt this approach because Congress has recently consid-
ered, and rejected, several bills that would have modified some of the current
laws to require consideration of distributional impacts. 7 ' Although Congress
is unlikely to enact new legislation that requires government regulators to
consider the distributional impacts of decisions under market-based environ-
mental reform programs or under command and control environmental laws,
existing laws, coupled with the environmental justice executive order,2 may
267. The narrow approach seems to be a variant of the "fine-tuning" of environmental
regulation discussed by Professor Howard Latin in his seminal article, Ideal Versus Real
Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning"Regulatory
Reforms. See Latin, supra note 4, at 1267-1332.
268. See id. at 1279.
269. See id. at 1281. Latin astutely observed that"theoretically 'efficient' regulatory strat-
egies require more data, more sophisticated scientific and economic analyses, more agency
expertise and resources, and more cooperation from regulated parties." Id at 1304.
270. While the Clean Water Act authorizes EPA and states to impose limits on water
pollution discharges that are more stringent than technology-based limits if it is necessary to
meet water quality standards for the body of water where the discharge occurs, the agencies
have been reluctant to impose those more stringent limits. Id. at 1305. Similarly, EPA and
states have been reluctant to regulate toxic water pollutants under Section 307(a) of the Clean
Water Act, or hazardous air pollutants under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act. Id. at 1307-09.
Professor Latin argues that these failures are due to the problems previously identified regarding
"fine-tuning" of environmental regulations. Id. at 1309.
271. See, e.g., S. 1161, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 5326, 102d Cong. (1992); S. 2806, 102d
Cong. (1992).
272. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, supra note 264. The Executive Order does not impose
new legal requirements on federal agencies, but it implements requirements of NEPA and Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. Although citizens cannot obtain judicial review of the
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already require or authorize regulators to examine those issues to some
extent.
273
For instance, EPA's Environmental Appeals Board recently concluded
that the executive order requires EPA to examine the environmental and
public health impacts of RCRA permitting decisions on low-income commu-
nities and that the omnibus clause of RCRA 4 requires EPA or states to
include conditions in permits to ensure that the permits protect health or the
environment of low-income communities (or any communities) and to deny
permits when it is not possible to include conditions in the permit that protect
the communities.275 Other command and control environmental laws contain
similar omnibus clauses. 6
executive order or agency compliance with the executive order, id. § 6-609, EPA's Environmen-
tal Appeals Board has held that administrative review of an agency's compliance with the order
is available. See In re Chemical Waste Mgt. of Ind., Inc., INO 078911146, 1995 EPA App.
LEXIS 25, at *14-'*15 (June 25, 1995).
273. See Richard J. Lazarus, Fairness in EnvironmentalLaw, ENVTL. L. 705,717 (1997).
Professor Richard Lazarus identifies several Clean Air Act provisions that require, or authorize,
governments to consider distributional factors. See id. at 718-19. He notes that sections of the
Clean Air Act require agencies to consider distributional factors when setting national ambient
air quality standards, id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7408), redesignating nonattainment areas, id. (citing
42 U.S.C. § 7470), waiving certain requirements for new sources of air pollution, icl at 719
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 7411), and siting solid waste incinerators, id. at 720 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 7429).
274. See 42 U.S.C. § 6925(c)(3) (1994) (noting RCRA permits must include "such terms
and conditions as the Administrator (or the state) determines may be necessary to protect human
health and the environment").
275. See In re Chemical Waste Mgt. ofInd., Inc., INO 078911046,1995 EPAApp. LEXIS
25, at * 17 (June 25, 1995). RCRA does not require the government to treat low-income
communities differently than other communities. Instead, the Environmental Appeals Board
held that the executive order requires EPA or states to examine the health and environmental
impacts of a proposed permitting decision on a community more closely when a commenter
submits a "superficially plausible claim" that the decision will have a disproportionate impact
on minority or low-income residents and to include conditions in the permit, under the omnibus
clause, to protect the health and environment of those communities. Id. at *20-*24. The Board
noted:
It is certainly conceivable that, although analysis of a broad cross-section of the
community may not suggest a threat to human health and the environment from the
operation of a facility, such a broad analysis might mask the effects of the facility
on a disparately affected minority or low-income segment of the community.
(Moreover, such an analysis might have been based on assumptions that, though
true for a broad cross-section of the community, are not true for the smaller minor-
ity or low-income segment of the community.)
Ide at *19-*20.
276. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1312(a), 1342(a)(1)(B) (outlining Clean WaterActpermitting
provisions); see also Lazarus, supra note 273, at 721 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7661 c(a)) (describing
Clean Air Act permitting provision). Professor Lazarus suggests that the omnibus clause could
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Similarly, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and many
state environmental policy acts require governments to consider distributional
impacts and other socioeconomic impacts of proposed actions that impact
the environment. 7 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board recently denied a license for a uranium enrich-
ment plant when the NRC failed to examine the distributional impacts of
issuing the license, as required by NEPA and the environmental justice exec-
utive order. 8
Finally, the environmental laws provide EPA and states with a great
amount of discretion in the enforcement of the laws,279 and courts are reluctant
to strike down an agency's decision to exercise its enforcement discretion in
a particular manner as arbitrary and capricious.28° Accordingly, regulators
could use their existing enforcement authorities more aggressively to reduce
the disparate impacts of pollution on low-income communities.2 ' Traditional
command and control laws could provide a partial safety net for low-income
communities in the absence of new legislative protections.
V Conclusion
In the current era ofantiregulatory sentiment, it is clear that market-based
environmental reforms will continue to proliferate and flourish. However, in
a free market, low-income communities will never have sufficient financial
resources to buy clean air, clean water, and similar environmental and public
health resources from wealthy communities or polluters. In addition, barriers
to collective organization or public participation, imperfect information, or
other market failures will often prevent low-income communities from even
participating in the market for those resources. Consequently, market-based
even be read to authorize permitting agencies to require permittees to provide access to
information necessary to oversee the facility's operation or to "enhance the resources" ofcitizen
groups that are charged with overseeing the operation of the facility. Id.
277. See Johnson IV, supra note 256, at 566, 579. However, NEPA and SEPAs only
require governments to consider those impacts. The laws do not prohibit government actions
that disproportionately impact low-income or minority communities. Id. af588.
278. See In re Louisiana Energy Servs., L.P., LBP-97-8 (May 1, 1997) (visited Aug. 8,
1998) <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ASLBP/lesj9.html>.
279. The laws give government regulators considerable discretion in choosing the targets
of enforcement actions, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (Clean AirAct); 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (RCRA);
33 U.S.C. § 1319 (Clean Water Act), and in choosing the amount or type of penalties in
enforcement actions, see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (Clean WaterAct); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)-(e)
(Clean Air Act).
280. See Hecklerv. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-35 (1985) (holding that agency's decision
not to bring enforcement action is not subject to judicial review).
281. See Lazarus, supra note 273, at 720.
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environmental reforms could exacerbate the inequitable distribution of pollu-
tion in low-income communities.
In the future, market-based reforms should address these market failures
and include measures to prevent environmental injustice. The preceding Part
describes many ways that the reforms should be amended to enable low-
income communities to bargain for environmental and health benefits on a
more level playing field. Market-based programs should ensure that commu-
nities receive information about health and environmental benefits of pro-
posed actions under the programs in an inexpensive, timely, and accessible
manner. The programs should make grants, loans, and other economic assis-
tance available to communities to enable the communities to evaluate the
impacts of proposed actions and to participate in the decisionmaking pro-
cesses under the programs. The programs should include broad and flexible
public participation provisions to facilitate public access to the decision-
making processes.
While these reforms will make it easier for low-income communities to
understand the impacts of proposed actions and to participate in the bargain-
ing for environmental and health resources in the market, low-income commu-
nities will still lack the necessary financial resources to purchase the environ-
mental and health resources because of the existing disparities in wealth
distribution. Accordingly, some command and control safety nets, such as
limits on trades or waivers in particular communities, may be necessary to
prevent market-based actions that would disparately impact those communi-
ties.
If governments adopt these modifications to market-based reforms, the
programs could ultimately achieve both economic and equity goals. If not,
market-based reforms will probably exacerbate the existing problems ofenvir-
onmental injustice.
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